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By examining the impact of labor market policies on employees’ perceptions of job 
security, this dissertation seeks to understand the mechanisms through which formal 
institutions generate confidence and positive expectations among individuals 
regarding their economic future. The following questions guide my research: Does 
dismissal protection give employees confidence in the continuity of their jobs? Do 
unemployment benefits increase employees’ confidence of finding a new job and 
reduce their worries about job loss? In addition to the intended consequences, I also 
explore the unintended effects of labor market policies. Specifically, I ask: Does the 
presence of temporary employees affect perceived job security? To what degree do 
temporary workers mediate the effects of other policies? 
In the first empirical analysis, I apply multilevel-modeling techniques to a 
dataset that I created by merging large-scale survey data from individuals in 20 
countries with macro-level information from various data sources. The second 
empirical analysis involves in-depth interview data collected from employees at one 
German and one American university. The quantitative data allow me to identify 
 associations between national-level policies and perceptions across a large sample of 
countries, and the qualitative data help me to meaningfully interpret and supplement 
these results.  
My main finding is that perceptions are not always congruent with economic 
and institutional facts. Organizational characteristics and individual differences seem 
to be more relevant than national-level policies to how workers feel about their jobs. 
The second important finding is that the effects of policies vary depending on their 
design. Formal institutions that reduce vulnerability by providing assurance 
(unemployment benefits) and by establishing a comparison group with lower levels of 
protection (temporary workers) seem to be more effective in instilling confidence and 
positive expectations than those that increase the costs for unilateral breach of contract 
(dismissal protection). 
These findings are of theoretical importance in challenging the implicit 
rationality assumption that formal institutions always achieve their intended outcomes, 
an assumption which underlies the bulk of comparative research on welfare states and 
national production systems. They are also of practical relevance, as they can help to 
inform the development of labor market policies and organizational measures intended 
to increase workers’ sense of job security.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
By analyzing the association between labor market policies and perceived job 
security, this dissertation addresses the question of whether and how formal 
institutions can generate confidence and positive expectations among individuals 
regarding their economic future. While individual and organizational characteristics 
that contribute to individuals’ feelings of job security have been widely explored (e.g., 
De Witte, 1999; Dekker & Schaufeli, 1995; Heaney, Israel, & House, 1994; Kinnunen, 
Mauno, Natti, & Happonen, 2000; Roskies & Louis-Guerin, 1990; Sverke, Hellgren, 
& Näswall, 2002), the larger contextual causes of job security have received much less 
attention (Erlinghagen, 2008; Clark & Postel-Vinay 2009, comparing levels of job 
perceived security within Europe, Anderson & Pontusson, 2007, examining data for 
1997 and also including non-European countries).  
I therefore apply an institutional approach to individual-level perceptions of 
job security and seek to answer the following questions: What are the mechanisms 
through which institutions generate such confidence and positive expectations? Can 
national labor market institutions and policies make employees less worried about 
their economic future? Does dismissal protection give employees confidence in the 
continuity of their jobs? Do generous unemployment benefits increase employees’ 
confidence of finding a new job of comparable quality – either because they can take 
their time to carefully look for a new job or because they receive counseling and 
training?  
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While these questions focus on the (presumably) intended consequences of 
labor market policies, I also explore the (again presumably) unintended consequences 
of policies for individuals’ sense of job security, namely the impact of the presence of 
temporary workers on perceptions of job security. In many places, temporary workers 
have been used to offset organizations’ lack of external flexibility caused by the 
stringent protections against lay-offs of regular workers. Therefore, I also ask Does the 
presence of temporary employees in the labor force affect feelings of job security, and 
does this mediate the effects of other national labor market policies? 
Answering these questions is important for several reasons. First, subjective 
perceptions and interpretations of situations often entail “real” outcomes, even if they 
are based on “incorrect” interpretations of the environment (Diamond & Dybvig, 
1983; Merton, 1995; Thomas & Thomas, 1928).  Especially in times of economic 
turmoil and uncertainty, it is critically important that employees, employers, and 
consumers remain confident of an eventual return to prosperity. If consumers believe 
that a recession will draw to a close, economic demand will increase. If, however, 
employees believe that their jobs are endangered (even if they actually are not), they 
suffer from the negative psychological and physiological consequences associated 
with a lack of job security (Ashford, Lee, & Bobko, 1989; Ferrie, 2001; Sverke et al., 
2002), and employers have to deal with decreased loyalty, reduced organizational 
commitment, and elevated turnover rates (De Witte & Naeswall, 2003; Hellgren, 
Sverke, & Isaksson, 1999). The economy as a whole, moreover, can be harmed by 
slumps in consumer spending and excessive wage restraints (Benito, 2005; Green, 
Felstead, & Burchell, 2000).  
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Second, uncovering the link between macro-level institutions and micro-level 
perceptions will aid us in understanding the conditions under which formal institutions 
such as laws, policies, and contracts generate confidence and positive expectations, in 
particular in unequal exchange relationships, as is the case in employment. This 
question has thus far received inadequate attention. Experimental research in 
behavioral economics, for example, has examined the emergence of positive 
expectations only in the context of an exchange relationship between equals, but not 
among parties with unequal power (e.g., Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995; Bolle, 
1998; Buskens & Weesie, 2000; Kollock, 1994, who used measures of trust and giving 
behaviors as the outcome variable). 
Third, this study tests the implicit assumption underlying the design of many 
policies and the large bulk of the comparative welfare state literature. Both 
policymakers and researchers often assume that policies and regulations impact human 
behavior in specific ways. Policymakers use regulations and policies to channel 
human behavior; researchers use the presence or absence of particular institutional 
arrangements to explain cross-national differences in economic development and 
performance. For example, in their influential work on the comparative institutional 
advantages of different capitalist systems, Hall and Soskice (2001b) contend that 
formal institutions, such as labor laws and welfare provisions, enable firms to pursue 
specific business strategies. They argue that employers in countries with generous 
unemployment benefits and stringent employment protection are more likely to invest 
in the training and education of their workers than employers in those countries with 
less generous benefits and less stringent protections. The benefits and protections, 
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moreover, also make it less risky for workers to acquire firm or industry-specific 
skills, either because they have the prospect of staying with a particular employer for 
an extended period of time or because they will have the time to look for a job that 
matches their qualifications in case of a lay-off (Estevez-Abe, Iversen, & Soskice, 
2001; Hall et al., 2001b). While this argument is plausible, few studies have actually 
examined whether, and to what degree, the assumed relationships between national 
policies, organizational practices, and individual perceptions and decision-making do 
in fact hold true. I therefore seek to fill this gap with two studies that focus on the 
relationship between national-level labor market policies and individual-level 
perceptions of job security.  
My main focus is on exchange situations in which power and dependence are 
unequally distributed between the parties. In other words, I am most interested in 
situations in which a party A is more dependent on a party B to achieve a valued 
outcome, so that B has more power over A than vice versa. A’s dependency, and thus 
B’s power, is based on the value of the exchange outcome as well as on the degree to 
which A has alternative exchange opportunities. This relational view of power, which 
promotes power and dependency as two inversely-related concepts, originates from 
social exchange theory (Emerson, 1972 a, b) and is particularly useful in analyzing 
employee-employer relationships (e.g., Shore & Tetrick, 1994. The patient-physician 
relationship would be another example for unequal power and dependency within an 
exchange context.).  
I examine the efficacy of three institutional mechanisms that can help 
exchange partners, particularly those with little power within the relationship, to 
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develop confidence and positive expectations about their situations: first, increasing 
the costs of a unilateral breach of contract (i.e., reducing power differentials between 
exchange partners); second, providing compensation in case of a unilateral breach of 
contract (i.e., reducing vulnerability); third, establishing a comparison group with 
lower levels of protection (i.e., decreasing relative risks and vulnerability).  
In the first study, I apply multi-level analyses to a large-scale, cross-national 
survey dataset that I merged with national-level information on public policies and 
economic conditions in order to explore the relationship between macro-level policies 
and micro-level perceptions across a large number of countries. In the second study, I 
analyze qualitative data that I collected in in-depth interviews with employees at one 
German and one American university in order to more fully explore the sources of 
some of the counterintuitive findings of the first study and to assess the consequences 
of variations in perceived job security. 
The first chapter reviews the comparative welfare state literature with respect 
to the theoretical question of how institutions generate the confidence and positive 
expectations needed to make exchanges happen. The three distinct mechanisms that 
potentially increase confidence in a positive exchange outcome are then applied to the 
specific context of employment contracts and employees’ perceptions of work-related 
security. Chapter 2 elaborates on the concept of perceived job security as well as on its 
causes and consequences, while Chapter 3 does the same for national-level labor 
market institutions and their presumably intended and unintended effects on workers’ 
perceptions of job security. In Chapter 4, I develop hypotheses regarding the 
relationships between different types of labor market policies and the various facets of 
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perceived job security. The first empirical analyses of this dissertation are presented in 
Chapter 5, in which I describe the sources and structure of the quantitative data, 
explain the multi-level estimation approach used in the study, and present and discuss 
the results. In Chapter 6, I use the qualitative data to further interpret the findings of 
the first study to obtain a deeper understanding of what makes employees feel secure 
about their jobs. Here again, I first describe the data, their origin, and my analytical 
approach. I conclude in Chapter 7 with a general discussion of the role of institutions 
in generating confidence and positive expectations in unequal exchange relationships, 
after which I discuss the contributions of this study and its limitations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Rational choice approaches to institutions in the comparative welfare state and 
labor market research  
 
Comparative research into political and economic institutions and their 
consequences for the organization of human life has a long tradition in the social 
sciences and has grown steadily with the expansion of welfare state activities by local 
and national governments (Montesquieu, 1949 (1750); Tocqueville, 1945 (1835, 1840) 
are two of the earliest examples of such comparative studies). Scholars in sociology, 
political science, and economics have dealt with the question of how institutions shape 
the organization of work, individual well-being, and economic life in general (e.g., 
Abramovitz, 1988; Blanchard & Landier, 2002; Esping-Andersen, 1990, 2000; 
Fligstein, 2001; Lewis, 1992; Marler & Tolbert, 2003; Moran, 2000; Muffels, 2002; 
Orloff, 1993; Pierson, 1994, 1996; Scharpf, 2000; Scharpf & Schmidt, 2000; Titmuss, 
1968). One of the major implications of this research is that the institutions of the 
welfare state are not only a reaction to but also a constitutive part of modern 
capitalism and economic organization (Polanyi 1944).  
In this literature, but also more generally, institutions are defined as the widely 
accepted social understandings that establish stable frameworks for ongoing 
interactions, thereby governing the behavior of organizations and individuals within 
particular communities and establishing social order (e.g., Durkheim, 1964; Giddens, 
1984; North, 1990; Parsons, 1951; Scott, 2008; Selznick, 1957). This broad definition 
implies that institutions can be both formal, e.g., contracts, laws, or policies, and 
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informal, e.g., norms, customs, or traditions.1 While the latter are often resistant to 
purposeful alteration, policymakers often enact change in formal institutions in order 
to influence individual and organizational choices in particular ways (e.g., Esping-
Andersen, 1990; Hall et al., 2001b; Kalev, Dobbin, & Kelly, 2006; Korpi & Palme, 
1998; March & Simon, 1957).  
The rules and incentives embedded in welfare institutions and economic 
policies reflect this motive. For example, to increase consumer spending and to create 
jobs, national governments have cut taxes. To direct individual spending to particular 
economic sectors, they have provided subsidies for the purchase of certain goods and 
services, such as the “cash-for-clunkers” program in the U.S. and the “scrapping 
premium” in Germany during the financial crisis in 2008/09 (GAO/Clowers, 2010). 
To offset decreasing old age pension benefits, policy makers have offered tax 
deductions to encourage retirement saving (e.g., Hinrichs, 2000). To foster 
entrepreneurial activities, they have relaxed bureaucratic regulations and provided 
easy access to capital (e.g., Torrini, 2005). To encourage individual labor market and 
reproduction behaviors, they have established family policies that help parents to 
combine work and family duties (Bothfeld, 2005; Ferrarini, 2003). To stabilize the 
economy in times of economic downturns, they have established rules for lay-offs and 
imposed taxes or social contributions to support the unemployed (i.e., regulations and 
policies which economists call “automatic stabilizers”; e.g., Esping-Andersen, 1985; 
1990; Korpi, 1983; Stephens, 1979). In short, variations in social policies and labor 
                                                
1 In this dissertation, the term “formal institutions” encompasses all types of governments policies, 
laws, and regulations; the terms are therefore also used interchangeably. 
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market legislation are intended to produce changes in established behaviors of 
individuals and organizations.  
The idea that formal institutions funnel individuals’ and organizations’ actions 
in specific ways has also been promoted by scholars from the “Varieties of 
Capitalism” tradition. In their influential work on the two ideal types of capitalist 
economies – the U.S. as the prototype of a liberal market economy and Germany of a 
coordinated market economy – Hall and Soskice (2001b) argue that firms, as the key 
actors in capitalist economies, make strategic decisions according to their 
technological, economic, and institutional environment, thereby influencing the 
behavior of employees, stakeholders, unions, and business associations. Due to 
differences across countries, firms encounter varying degrees of the typical agency 
and coordination problems, such as moral hazard, adverse selection, and shirking 
(Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). For example, by affecting the costs for employers to hire 
and fire workers, national welfare state policies and labor market institutions also 
influence employers’ decisions to train workers. In addition, they affect workers’ 
willingness to acquire firm or sector-specific skills.  
In the presence of generous unemployment benefits and stringent employment 
protection, as is the case in coordinated market economies, providing and acquiring 
firm or industry-specific skills does not involve great risks for either the employer or 
the employee. If workers are well-protected against sudden lay-offs, feel secure about 
their jobs, and can take their time to look for a new job that matches their skills and 
needs, investing in firm or industry-specific skills is likely to contribute to professional 
advancement and is therefore a reasonable investment. When these regulative 
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employment institutions are absent or only poorly developed, as is the case in liberal 
market economies, neither firms nor employees feel confident about entering a long-
term relationship and thus will not be inclined to make similar investments in the 
employees’ human capital. If workers can be easily laid off and cannot rely on 
generous unemployment benefits ensuring that they will have the time to find jobs that 
match their qualifications, they profit more by being generalists who are able to work 
in many different jobs (Becker, 1964; Crouch, 2005; Estevez-Abe et al., 2001; Mares, 
2000; Soskice, 1999; Swenson, 2002; 2004).2 The implicit assumption underlying the 
central argument of the “Varieties of Capitalism” framework (Hall et al., 2001b) is 
thus that institutions work in the way they are intended to work and that they are 
perceived accordingly; that is, stringent dismissal protection and generous 
unemployment benefits assure workers  that acquiring specific skills is worth the 
investment.  
Although the comparative literature on welfare states has repeatedly argued 
that institutions impact individual and organizational outcomes, it is unclear whether 
a) formal institutions achieve their intended outcomes under all circumstances and b) 
all types of formal institutions have the same propensity to effectively influence 
individual and organizational actions. Research on the functioning of institutions is 
helpful in providing an answer to the first question, and the second can be answered 
                                                
2 These tendencies are fortified in that welfare state policies and regulations also affect workers’ 
capacity to form unions and go on strike (Manow, 1997; Rothstein, 1992). Since the acquisition and 
provision of different skill sets has a major impact on the innovation strategies that organizations in 
different countries pursue, Hall and Soskice (2001b) even argue that the two distinct types of skill 
regimes yield distinct production and innovation regimes. Incremental innovations are more likely to 
occur in coordinated market economies and radical change and innovations in liberal market economies. 
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by closely considering the different mechanisms that institutions can rely on, as will 
be shown in the following sections. 
 
Different types of institutions and their functioning 
Scott’s (2008) distinction between regulative, normative, and cognitive-cultural 
pillars of institutions is helpful in comprehending the various ways in which 
institutions can impact perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. The regulative pillar of 
an institution consists of its formal and legal elements, the normative pillar of informal 
norms and social obligations, and the cognitive-cultural pillar of the interpretative 
processes and the taken-for-granted behaviors shaped by the external culture (Scott 
2008: 50ff). In other words, individuals and organizations can act on incentives and 
enforceable rules, perceived social obligations, and taken-for-granted norms and 
beliefs, as well as their interactions. Formal policies and institutions provide deterrents 
and incentives; they can confer power upon individuals and organizations through 
laws, policies, the allocation of resources, or formal positions in a hierarchy (Barley & 
Tolbert, 1997). Moreover, they influence behaviors of individual and collective actors 
by conveying normative frameworks and shaping the attitudes and perceptions of 
those who act within their sphere of influence (Hall & Soskice, 2001a). While these 
three institutional “pillars” can be distinguished analytically, they are actually difficult 
to distinguish in practice, as they form a continuum ranging from the conscious to the 
unconscious, from the legally enforced to the taken-for-granted, and operate 
simultaneously and in interaction with each other (Hoffman, 1997: 36).  
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Employment relationships, for example, are based on national laws and 
regulations and the contractual agreement between the employee and the employer. 
However, like most contractual agreements, employment contracts do not yield 
positive outcomes only because of these regulative aspects, since they are not able to 
specify all possible contingencies and cannot fully exclude the risk of opportunism 
and malfeasance (Frey & Jegen, 2001; Luhmann, [1968] 1979; Williamson, 1975, 
1985). In contrast to sale agreements, which regulate the details of a discrete 
transaction, the employment contract is characterized by a high degree of openness, 
specifying only the most fundamental terms of the exchange, such as job description, 
working hours, salary, fringe benefits, and the conditions of job termination, while 
leaving open the specifics, such as the exact date of completion of the tasks and their 
actual implementation (Marsden, 1999). Despite the contractual agreement, employees 
may withhold effort and knowledge and may leave the organization when better 
employment opportunities arise. Likewise, employers may lay off employees in times 
of economic downturn and hire new ones in times of high economic demand, instead 
of retaining employees in exchange for their efforts, commitment, and performance.  
Therefore, cultural norms and customs, as well as informal expectations and 
mutual trust, are other important elements that contribute to the smooth functioning of 
work arrangements. The mutual beliefs and unwritten expectations of the employer 
and the employee – also known as the “psychological contract” (Argyris, 1960; 
Robinson, 1996; Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Greller, 1994; Rousseau & Schalk, 
2000; Schein, 1980; Shore et al., 1994) – are important sources of confidence that 
influence individuals’ attitudes and behaviors. The implicit terms of the 
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“psychological contract” help both parties to reduce uncertainty and ambiguity. While 
the employee has the feeling of being able to influence her or his work situation, the 
employer benefits from this implicit agreement because she or he can be confident that 
the employee will do what is expected, even in the absence of any surveillance 
mechanism. 
What becomes clear from the explanations above is that the formal elements of 
institutions are linked to the normative and cognitive-cultural elements of institutions 
and vice versa and that both formal and informal elements of institutions can influence 
perceptions, attitudes, and expectations (DiMaggio, 1988; Friedland & Alford, 1991; 
Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Tolbert, 1985; Tolbert & Zucker, 1983; 
Zucker, 1991). Even incomplete knowledge of the laws and regulations underlying 
contractual agreements or the general stipulations of these agreements influence the 
individuals’ expectations and beliefs and thereby make exchanges possible.  
For example, savers entrust their money to financial institutions without 
knowing how well their assets are protected in the case that the bank runs into 
difficulties, simply because they have some basic trust in the competence of these 
organizations and the protective responsibilities of the supervising institutions. 
Likewise, eating food and taking medication without doing intensive background 
research about the ingredients and adverse effects is possible only because we know 
that others also consume these products and that the certifying agencies, such as the 
FDA, have tested and approved them. In the context of the employment relationship, 
the formal agreements in combination with the mutual beliefs and unwritten 
expectations make it possible for employees to do their work without being worried 
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that they will lose their jobs and income the very next day (Robinson, 1996; Rousseau, 
1995; Rousseau et al., 2000). 
In addition to considering these vague beliefs about how institutions work, I 
argue that the different institutional mechanisms potentially influencing expectations 
about exchange outcomes should be distinguished in order to clarify the conditions 
under which formal institutions indeed impact individual and organizational actions. 
Like any other contractual agreement, employment contracts reduce the uncertainty 
surrounding an exchange by specifying what is expected of each party. The laws and 
regulations that are incorporated in the employment contract acknowledge the 
differences in power and dependence between exchange parties and aim to protect the 
low-power partner from exploitation (Bacharach & Lawler, 1981; Fox, 1974).  
To varying degrees, labor laws and collective bargaining agreements all over 
the world strengthen the employee’s position in the employment relationship by 
supplementing the employment contract with provisions of fairness and cooperation 
(Gabel & Feinman, 1998; Gundlach & Murphy, 1993; Posner, 1995; Shiffrin, 2000). 
Such institutions can protect workers from having to agree to obligations without 
defined limits (Coase, 1937; Marsden, 1999), thereby adjusting the inequalities in 
structural power between the employee and the employer (Bacharach et al., 1981; Fox, 
1974). These laws and regulations differ considerably across countries and have been 
intensively studied by comparative researchers (Clarke 2004; Clasen 2005; Esping-
Andersen 1990, 1996, 1999; Fligstein 2001; Lewis 1992; Muffels and Fouarge 2002; 
Orloff 1993; Hall and Soskice 2001; Rueda and Pontusson 2000; Swenson 2004). 
What has remained under-researched thus far are the various mechanisms that underlie 
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such policies and regulations and their effects on the exchange partners’ expectations 
and confidence about the outcomes of agreements.  
A close examination of the different types of welfare state and labor market 
policies, however, reveal three mechanisms by through which institutions can affect 
exchange partners’ expectations. For one, formal institutions can impose costs on the 
party that breaches the contract and thereby reduce the power differentials between 
exchange partners. In addition, they can provide compensation to the injured party in 
case of a unilateral breach of contract. A third mechanism that may help individuals to 
feel confident about a positive exchange outcome is the presence of a reference 
person, or reference group, that is more likely to be dismissed first, thus providing a 
buffer for the focal actor. These ideas are captured in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Institutional Mechanisms Generating Confidence and Positive Expectations 
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Three types of labor market policies capture these types of institutional 
mechanisms. Dismissal protection reduces the power-differentials between the 
employee and the employer; unemployment benefits provide workers with 
compensation in case they are laid off by their employers; legislation regarding the 
employment of temporary workers strengthen the relative position of permanent 
employees by affecting employers’ possibility to flexibly adjust their personnel 
through temporary positions.  
Although these institutions are presumably created to assure employees of 
certain protections and thus to influence their behaviors in predicted directions, there 
are a number of reasons for why we can still not be sure that institutions indeed 
produce their intended outcomes. Previous work in sociology and psychology – and 
more recently also in behavioral economics – has challenged the idea that institutions 
always work in a straightforward way, as the literature review in next section 
illustrates. 
 
Challenges to the rational choice approach towards forma l institutions 
With his seminal paper The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social 
Action (1936), Merton popularized the idea that institutions may encounter attitudinal 
and behavioral outcomes that are neither planned nor expected (e.g., McKinley & 
Scherer, 2000; Rogers, 1995; Tenner, 1997). Institutions may not work as intended, 
either because their design is flawed, e.g., the incentives and sanctions set in place do 
not work, or because individuals do not embrace them as expected, e.g., they are 
unaware of the existence of certain policies and regulations or may not perceive them as 
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legitimate and therefore ignore them. Error and ignorance due to the complexity of 
social life and lack of information can lead to unintended consequences, including 
short-term orientations, perverse incentives, and unstable preferences (Ariely, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2006; Festinger, 1957; Hipp & Warner, 2008; Lee, Amir, & 
Ariely, 2009; Simon, 1947, 1957). 
A famous example of a policy that had unexpected outcomes was the ban on the 
production, transportation, and sale of alcohol in the U.S. in the early 20th century. 
While Prohibition was successful in reducing the amount of alcohol consumed, it 
eliminated neither its sale, manufacture, nor transport. Instead, the increased 
profitability of the illegal alcohol industry drove small suppliers out of business and 
made the trade of alcohol more attractive. A less severe but also unintended 
consequence was the emergence and rise of the soft-drink industry (Hiatt, Sine, & 
Tolbert, 2009).  
The reasons why institutions fail to achieve their stated outcomes but rather 
produce unexpected results are manifold. Work by social psychologists, for example, 
has extensively documented common biases that affect individual decision-making 
(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, 1981); human beings have 
trouble using statistical information appropriately when making decisions. They assume 
that past events alter the probabilities of future events or weight initial events more 
heavily than subsequent ones. Human beings tend to overestimate the risk of events that 
have occurred recently, that are unusual, or of which they have vivid memories 
(availability bias).  
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Hence, personal experience and observations may exert a much more powerful 
influence on individuals’ perceptions than abstract policies and regulations. For 
example, the more experience people have with unemployment, the less confident they 
may be about keeping their jobs despite good protections against lay-offs. Knowing that 
others have lost their jobs and have then had a hard time finding new ones (or had no 
problem at all) may also have a stronger impact on workers’ optimism about quickly 
finding new jobs than the support given to laid-off workers by unemployment insurance 
programs (see Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman, 2002 for an overview on the long list of 
cognitive biases).  
Moreover, social comparisons and subjective perceptions may influence a 
person’s satisfaction with her or his situation more than the actual situation itself 
(Crosby, 1982; Stouffer, 1949). Comparisons reveal what one person has in relation to 
others, and research has shown that comparisons with those with similar positions and 
rank, of the same age, or with comparable experience are especially important for 
individual well-being, satisfaction, aspirations, and attitudes (Davis, 1966; Pettigrew et 
al., 2008; Runciman & Bagley, 1969; Yitzhaki, 1979). For example, in his studies on 
the American military after World War II, Stouffer (1949) showed that soldiers in units 
with high rates of promotion, i.e., an objectively favorable situation, had lower morale 
and greater dissatisfaction with the promotion system than their counterparts in units 
with lower rates. Crosby (1982) made a similar discovery when she compared men’s 
and women’s job satisfaction in relation to their respective earnings. In spite of 
considerably lower wages, women were not any less satisfied with their jobs than men.  
  19 
The explanation for these findings is that individuals apply varying frames of 
reference when assessing their situations (Tversky et al., 1981; 1986). The soldiers in 
units with a greater likelihood of promotion who did not get promoted were more aware 
of the opportunities for promotion than their counterparts in units with lower rates of 
promotion and felt that they did not get what they deserved. Likewise, rather than 
comparing their situation to those of their male counterparts, women compared 
themselves to other female workers and therefore did not report greater anger or 
dissatisfaction with their work, despite lower wages.  
In addition, some institutions and policies may be ineffective or produce 
unexpected outcomes simply because individuals or organizations are unaware of their 
existence or have false or incomplete knowledge regarding the policies and regulations 
in place. For example, in their study of psychological and legal contracts, Roehling 
and Boswell (2004) showed that employees in the U.S. working under at-will 
contracts still believed that their employer would need to have a good reason to lay 
them off. Despite signing the clause stating that both the employee and the employer 
can end the employment relationship at any point “for good cause, or bad cause, or no 
cause at all,” employees believed that some sort of warning system was in place or 
that at least some justification was required to end the employment.  
The reasons for such misjudgments and miscalculations can also be found 
within the bundle of explanations that social psychologists have identified to explain 
individuals’ poor decision-making and information-processing skills (Ariely & Jones, 
2008; Festinger, 1957; Gilovich et al., 2002). Individuals may under- or overestimate 
the protective effects of policies and regulations as they are included/written in 
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employment contracts because they rely on only one piece of information rather than 
considering all information available (anchoring effect) or because they draw general 
conclusions about someone’s personality or an organization’s culture based on one 
specific piece of information (halo effect). Applied to the context of Roehling and 
Boswell (2004), who studied workers’ assessments of their protection against lay-offs, 
these biases can provide an explanation for why employees are more likely to 
incorporate their observations of previous terminations than the written terms of the 
actual contract into their evaluations of their level of job protection. It could also be 
that they overestimate their rights because they have a positive image of their 
supervisors or the organization and therefore tend not to think of the formal agreement 
they have with the organization. 
Figure 2 provides an overview on the argument that has been made thus far, 
i.e., the types of institutional mechanisms that potentially instill confidence and 
positive expectations along with possible mechanisms preventing these institutions 
from operating in a straightforward way.  
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Figure 2: Relationship between Formal Institutions and Confidence and Positive 
Expectations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Whether these institutional and cognitive shortcomings actually limit the 
capacity of formal institutions and policies to generate particular behavioral or 
attitudinal outcomes is one of the questions that drives this dissertation. My subject is 
the relationship between labor market policies and perceptions of job security. Since 
the legal basis of employment relationships varies across countries, it is possible to 
examine whether and to what degree labor market policies impact individuals’ 
expectations about their future employment prospects. The next section will therefore 
elaborate in more detail on the concept of perceived job security, its consequences, 
and its causes. 
  22 
CHAPTER 3 
PERCEIVED JOB SECURITY 
 
 Since the relationship between the employer and the employee is characterized by 
unequal power (i.e., the employee is more dependent on the employer than vice versa 
and therefore has less power within the relationship; see Emerson, 1962; Lawler, 
1992; Lawler, Thye, & Yoon, 2008; Lawler & Yoon, 1993) workers cannot be sure 
that they will not have to leave their jobs unwillingly. Thus, it would not be surprising 
if they worried about this prospect. Since work is not only a source of income but also 
contributes to individual development, the emergence and maintenance of personal 
relationships, and social status (Jahoda, 1982), the threat of losing a job actually 
involves far more than just the loss of income, as it strongly impacts workers’ 
psychological and physical well-being (Sverke et al., 2002). The following section 
defines perceived job security and then reviews the literature regarding its relevance 
and origins. 
 
Definition of perceived job security 
Perceived job security is a psychological construct describing employees’ 
belief that they have some sort of power and control over their current job situation.3 
This definition of job security encompasses three dimensions. Individuals can be 
                                                
3 Although the literature on needs and motivation has been the basis for the research on security in 
organizations (Greenhalgh and Rosenblatt, 1984: 439f), the term “job insecurity” rather than “job 
security” is most commonly used by industrial/organizational psychologists. Since the focus of this 
paper is on the propensity of institutions to generate positive expectations, I prefer to continue using the 
term “job security.”  
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confident of staying in the same job (Davy, Kinicki, & Scheck, 1997; Heaney et al., 
1994) or of the possibility of quickly finding a new job of comparable quality 
(Wilthagen & Tros, 2004). Both perspectives imply the absence of worry regarding 
job continuity or loss. Such absence of worry is the third element of perceived job 
security (Klandermans & Vuuren, 1999; Rosenblatt & Ruvio, 1996).  
In my dissertation, these three facets of perceived job security will be kept 
separate. Thus, I distinguish between (a) cognitive job security, that is, the perceived 
probability of job loss; (b) perceived employment prospects, that is, the perceived 
availability of alternate job opportunities; and (c) affective job security, that is, the 
absence of anxiety related to a potential job loss and/or not finding a new job. 
Previous research has shown that these concepts do not necessarily overlap but that 
they are related  (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Borg & Elizur, 1992). If workers feel 
confident of keeping their jobs (high cognitive job security), they may be less worried 
about job loss (high affective job security). Likewise, if they are confident that they 
will be able to easily find an equally good job (high perceived employment prospects), 
they may not be worried about unemployment – even if they are not confident of 
staying with their current employer. Table 1 summarizes the definitions of cognitive 
job security, perceived employment prospects, and affective job security and indicates 
how they might be related. 
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Table 1: Types of Perceived Job Security 
 
 
Consequences of a lack of perceived job security 
In the large body of research on perceived job security, the consequences of 
lacking job security have been of paramount importance. While economic theory 
suggests that job security – especially “too much” job security – has negative 
consequences for organizational performance (e.g., Khan & Rehnberg, 2009; Shapiro 
& Stiglitz, 1984)4, empirical work by psychologists has shown that the consequences 
of lacking job security are predominantly negative for individuals, organizations, and 
society as a whole (e.g., De Witte 1999, 2005, Green et al., 2000; Smithson & Lewis, 
2000; Sverke et al., 2002). 
                                                
4 Economists tend to assume that employees are primarily motivated by extrinsic incentives and 
therefore often use the example of public sector employees, who have “real” job security, to illustrate 
that too much job security has detrimental effects on workers’ performance.  
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Individual-level consequences. The prospect of losing a job is stressful   
because work secures not only one’s material well-being but also social integration, 
recognition, and structure in one’s daily life (Jahoda, 1982). Individuals who perceive 
that their jobs are at risk have to deal with a high degree of uncertainty. Such 
uncertainty about their future prevents employees from reacting appropriately and 
tends to be as stressful as or even more stressful than actual job loss (Dekker et al., 
1995; Latack & Dozier, 1986; Latack, Kinicki, & Prussia, 1995; Lazarus & Folkman, 
1984). Common “coping strategies” for actual job loss, including mourning and 
preparing for a new situation, are therefore of only limited use (Ashford, 1988; 
Lazarus et al., 1984; Miller, 1979; Mineka & Hendersen, 1985; Warr, 1987).  
In consequence, a lack of perceived job security leads to strain, worries, and 
anxiety. It reduces individual well-being (Barling & Kelloway, 1996; Hartley, 1991; 
Hellgren et al., 1999) and fosters physical and mental health problems, including sleep 
disruptions, dizziness, or loss of appetite (Ashford et al., 1989; Burchell, 1994; De 
Witte, 1999; 2005; Ferrie, 2001; Ferrie, Shipley, Newman, Stansfeld, & Marmot, 
2005; Sverke et al., 2002 for an overview).  
Organizational-level consequences. Employees’ lack of job security also has 
detrimental effects on organizations. Not only will their health change for the worse, 
leading to absence, but their attitudes and behaviors towards the organization will 
deteriorate as well (Greenhalgh & Rosenblatt, 1984). The implicit terms of the 
exchange between employees and employers, i.e., the “psychological contract” 
(Rousseau, 1995), becomes distorted when the employee’s loyalty vis-à-vis the 
organization is not reciprocated, for example by the provision of a secure job. Several 
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studies have shown that lack of job security is associated with a decrease in job 
satisfaction (Ashford et al., 1989; Blanchflower & Oswald, 1999; Cuyper & Witte, 
2006; Heaney et al., 1994; Rosenblatt et al., 1996) and a decrease in job involvement 
(Feather & Rauter, 2004; Hellgren et al., 1999; Probst, 2000).  
Moreover, when workers doubt that their future employment is secure, their 
organizational commitment declines (Borg et al., 1992; Davy et al., 1997; De Witte et 
al., 2003; Lum, Kervin, Clark, Reid, & Sirola, 1998; Pillay, 2010), as does their trust 
in the organization (Ashford et al., 1989; Borg et al., 1992; Gilbert & Tang, 1998; 
Kinnunen et al., 2000), and although work performance in general is not contingent on 
perceived job security (Pearce, 1998; Robinson, 1996; Rosenblatt et al., 1996; 
Rosenblatt, Talmud, & Ruvio, 1999; Sverke et al., 2002; Yousef, 1998), voluntary 
turnover increases, particularly among those with high qualifications and good labor 
market prospects, when employees believe that their future with the firm is in jeopardy 
(Barling et al., 1996; Chirumbolo & Hellgren, 2003; Pfeffer, 1998; Sverke & Hellgren, 
2001; Sverke et al., 2002). 
Societal and economic consequences. The negative impacts of the lack of job 
security are also reflected on the broader societal and economic level. Wage restraints 
and slumps in consumer demand are two negative consequences of lacking job 
security which harm the entire economy. If workers do not feel secure about their jobs, 
they do not ask for wage increases and tend to save their money instead of spending it, 
especially with regard to larger investments (Benito, 2005; Green et al., 2000). This 
has particularly negative effects on the housing market and possibly also on the 
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acquisition of human capital, further fostering labor market segmentation and 
economic inequality (ibid).  
In sum, the negative effects that a lack of perceived job security has on 
employees, their organizations, and the larger societal and economic environment can 
be either direct or indirect, as well as short-term or long-term. Table 2 summarizes all 
of the above-mentioned relationships. 
 Table 2: Consequences of Lack of Perceived Job Security 
 
 
 
Individual Level Organizational  
Level 
Societal  
Level 
Short-term 
Consequences 
Job Satisfaction ↓ 
Job Involvement ↓ 
Organizational  
Commitment ↓ 
Organizational  
Trust ↓ 
Consumer Spending ↓ 
Wage Restraints ↑ 
Long-term 
Consequences 
Health ↓ 
Mental  
Well-Being ↓ 
Job Performance ~ 
Perceived Job Performance ↓ 
Turnover (Intention) ↑ 
Economic Inequality ↑ 
Labor Market Segmentation ↑ 
Note: ↑  Increase, ↓  Decrease, ~  no association 
Source: Adapted from Sverke et al., 2002  
 
While there is a broad consensus on the existence of the negative consequences 
of lacking job security in the academic literature, it is not entirely clear how bad the 
negative consequences actually are. In their meta-analysis, Sverke et al. (2002) show 
that the strength of the relationship between a lack of perceived job security and 
individual and organizational outcomes vary considerably across studies. The 
associations between the various causes of perceived job security on the individual 
and organizational level, on the other hand, seem to be more consistent across studies, 
as will be shown in the following section. 
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Antecedents of perceived job security 
Research in organizational psychology has examined the individual-level and 
organizational-level antecedents of perceived job security in great detail DE WIITE 
(Ashford et al., 1989; Bender & Sloane, 1999; Kinnunen et al., 2000; Kinnunen & 
Natti, 1994; Roskies et al., 1990; Sverke et al., 2002). In general, all individual-level 
factors that increase employees’ power in the labor market and hence reduce their 
dependence on a particular job have positive effects on their perceived job security, 
while those that increase their dependence negatively affect their perceived job 
security.  
Individual-level antecedents. Since an individual’s dependence on a job is 
expected to amplify the degree of anxiety, age, marital status, and the presence of 
children in a household are important predictors for perceived job security.5 Older 
workers, especially those with a long tenure in their organization, have greater 
experience and are often equipped with more formal and informal seniority rights than 
their younger counterparts. Therefore, they usually feel more secure about keeping 
their jobs than their younger counterparts. However, since they tend to have greater 
difficulties finding new jobs, they may also be more worried about losing their jobs 
than younger workers. Most studies have confirmed this positive effect of age on 
                                                
5 Although no clear association between gender and perceived job security has been found in empirical 
studies, there are some theoretical reasons why gender is always included in quantitative analyses on 
perceptions of job security (e.g., De Witte, 1999; Näswall and De Witte, 2003; Böckerman, 2004). 
Women often have more vulnerable labor market positions than men, either due to lower levels of 
education or to a greater likelihood of discrimination, and may therefore have lower cognitive job 
security than men (Erlinghagen ,2008). However, the opposite may also be true. Due to their traditional 
role ascription as breadwinners, men may feel a greater dependence on their jobs and therefore 
experience more stress when facing the threat of losing them, i.e., have lower affective job security than 
women (Warr, 1987; Rosenblatt, Talmud et al., 1999). 
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cognitive job security and its negative effect on perceived employment prospects and 
affective job security (e.g., Anderson et al., 2007; Green, 2009; Näswall et al., 2003).  
Being married/being in a relationship also makes individuals less worried 
about job loss, i.e., increases their affective job security. In case of need, there is 
always the partner’s income or the possibility for the partner to start working, which 
can ensure the family’s material well-being. Having children, in contrast, increases 
individuals’ perceived dependence on their jobs. If more people in a household have to 
rely on a person’s income, this person may be more worried about losing her or his 
job, i.e., have lower affective job security. 
Workers’ skill and qualification levels also affect perceptions of job security. 
Highly skilled workers usually work on a variety of complex tasks and are often 
difficult to replace within organizations, increasing the odds that their employers will 
retain them. In consequence, they should be more confident about keeping their jobs, 
more optimistic about finding a new job in case of lay-off, and also less worried about 
a potential job loss than those who are less skilled. The positive relationship between 
education and perceived job security has been shown in a variety of studies (Anderson 
et al., 2007; Ashford et al., 1989; Böckerman, 2004; Erlinghagen, 2008; Näswall et al., 
2003). 
Differences in personality also seem to matter. The very same situation, in 
terms of “objective” threats to the continuity of employment, may be perceived very 
differently by different individuals. While some employees might not expect that their 
jobs are at risk even though everything points towards personnel restructuring and 
dismissals, others might be worried for no reason. Likewise, while some employees 
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see potential job loss as a problem, others might frame it as an opportunity (Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987). Individual differences – self-efficacy, locus of control, affectivity, and 
self-esteem, in particular – have been found to be important predictors and moderators 
in perceived job security (e.g., Bussing, 1999; Hartley, 1991; Kinnunen, Mauno, Natti, 
& Happonen, 1999; Sverke et al., 2002; Sverke et al., 2004). All of the above-
mentioned characteristics can thus contribute in varying degrees to individuals’ 
interpretations of their job situation (Roskies, Louis-Guerin, & Fournier, 1993). 
Organizational-level antecedents. In addition to individual-level 
characteristics, organizational attributes influence workers’ perceptions of job security 
(e.g., Allen, 1986; Borg et al., 1992; Burchell, Ladipo, & Wilkinson, 2001; De Witte, 
1999; Grimshaw, Ward, Rubery, & Beynon, 2001; Kinnunen et al., 2000; Roskies et 
al., 1990; Sverke et al., 2002). Firm size is one important predictor for affective and 
cognitive job security: With increasing firm size, workers tend to feel more secure 
about their jobs. Large firms often have internal labor markets and slack resources that 
allow them to employ creative solutions in times of restructuring; they can use flex-
time arrangements and reduce overtime to cope with cyclical economic fluctuations 
and they can retrain employees to employ them in other positions or in other 
departments of the organization (Doeringer & Piore, 1971). Furthermore, they usually 
articulate more clearly what is expected of employees. Formalized job descriptions 
and human resource practices go hand in hand with high levels of job security. 
Ashford et al. (1989), for example, have shown that role ambiguity and role conflict 
threaten an individual's sense of control and thereby cause feelings of job insecurity. 
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Large organizations, moreover, are also more likely to be unionized than small 
workplaces. Through collective bargaining agreements, workers may be protected 
against unfair dismissal and, in consequence, should also feel more protected against 
lay-offs (Freeman & Medoff, 1984; Freeman & Rogers, 1999), even though union 
membership does not necessarily have a positive impact on true job security (Green et 
al., 2000). Public sector employees enjoy high levels of job protection due either to 
their professional status as “public servants” or to high levels of unionization, and thus 
public sector employment is usually accompanied by increased levels of perceived job 
security.  
Workers’ feelings of job security, moreover, vary depending on the 
organization’s industrial category. Employees who work in a firm or an occupation 
that belongs to a growing industry with a prosperous economic future and low levels 
of unemployment tend to have higher levels of affective and cognitive job security as 
well as greater perceived employment prospects. This last point leads us directly to the 
country-level antecedents of perceived job security. 
Country-level antecedents. While the individual and organizational-level 
antecedents of perceived job security have been widely explored, country-level 
differences have been largely neglected in previous research. Although contextual 
factors such as unemployment rates, either on the regional or national level, were 
included in previous studies, studies that examine other country-level characteristics 
are scarce (Anderson et al., 2007; Böckerman, 2004; Clark & Postel-Vinay, 2009; 
Erlinghagen, 2008; Green, 2009). Since it is reasonable to believe that differences in 
employment contracts also affect workers’ expectations (e.g., Dalton & Anderson, 
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2010 for the impact of contextual factors on electoral choices), this dissertation is 
concerned with the question of how national employment legislation and labor market 
policies impact perceived job security. Figure 3 summarizes the concept that 
perceptions of job security can, in addition to important individual and organizational-
level characteristics, also be influenced by national-level institutions and economic 
conditions. 
 
Figure 3: Antecedents of Perceived Job Security 
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CHAPTER 4 
PREDICTIONS 
Dismissal protection and perceived job security 
By increasing the costs of firing workers, stringent dismissal protection makes 
lay-offs more difficult for employers. Since this should reduce the frequency of lay-
offs, employees should be more confident about the continuity of their jobs. My first 
hypothesis therefore reflects the general rational-choice approach to institutions and 
states that individuals in countries with high dismissal protection should have more 
confidence of keeping their jobs than those in countries with little or no dismissal 
protection (e.g., Estevez-Abe et al., 2001). Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1: More stringent levels of dismissal protection are associated with 
greater cognitive job security. 
 
However, while high levels of dismissal protections decrease the likelihood of 
sudden lay-offs, they may not be beneficial for workers per se. In those countries with 
stringent dismissal protection, workers not only are laid-off less frequently but also 
have greater difficulty finding employment once they have lost their jobs. In countries 
with low levels of dismissal protection, in contrast, both inflows into and outflows out 
of unemployment are high (e.g., Esping-Andersen & Regini, 2000). This means laid-off 
workers in countries with high levels of dismissal protection tend to be unemployed 
much longer than those in countries with less regulated labor markets. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2: More stringent levels of dismissal protection are associated with 
lower perceived employment prospects. 
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Proportion of temporary workers and perceived job security 
Because of these potentially adverse effects on labor market dynamics, many 
countries have sought to reduce labor market rigidities by making it easier for firms to 
hire employees on a temporary basis (Blanchard & Landier 2002, Esping-Andersen & 
Regini 2000). Temporary contracts provide employers with external flexibility 
because, by setting a fixed date for the termination of the employment contract, the 
employer does not have to enter into a long-term agreement with the employee 
(Atkinson 1985, Regini 2000).  
While such partial deregulation and two-tiered employment systems help firms 
to adapt their staffing so as to react quickly to market demands, the effects of temporary 
employment on employees are negative. Risks emerging from market volatilities are 
transferred from the employer to the temporary employee (Breen, 1997). Since 
temporary employees are among the first to leave the organization in economically 
difficult times, they serve as a buffer for permanent employees in firms facing the need 
for personnel reductions (DiPrete, Goux, Maurin, & Quesnel-Vallee, 2006; Gash, 2008; 
Giesecke & Gross, 2003; Kalleberg, 2000; Kalleberg, 2009; Kalleberg, Reskin, & 
Hudson, 2000; Rueda, 2005, 2007). This should make the regular employees more 
confident of keeping their jobs. Although previous research on how the presence of 
temporary workers affects the confidence of regular employees has produced mixed 
evidence (e.g., Banerjee & Tolbert, 2008), I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 3: A higher proportion of temporary workers will be associated 
with greater cognitive job security. 
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The comparison with those who are considerably less protected against lay-offs 
should make permanent employees feel even more secure about their jobs. In other 
words, the positive association between cognitive job security and the proportion of 
temporary workers should become even stronger with increasing protections against 
lay-offs for the permanent employees. Therefore, I hypothesize a positive interaction 
between dismissal protection and the proportion of temporary workers: 
 
Hypothesis 4: In countries with high levels of dismissal protection, a higher 
proportion of temporary workers will be associated with even greater cognitive 
job security. 
 
Unemployment benefits and perceived job security 
The compensation employees receive upon losing their jobs (i.e., 
unemployment benefits or social assistance) is another important element associated 
with the employment contract that differs among countries. In addition to income 
support after a job loss – which is a form of compensation granted in case of the 
employer’s unilateral violation of the contract – laid-off workers also receive 
assistance in the form of counseling, training, or wage subsidies in finding  new jobs.  
Although generous welfare provisions do not reduce the power differential 
between the employee and the employer and thus do not decrease the probability of 
job loss, they can still contribute to feelings of job security. Both passive and active 
unemployment benefits can mitigate the negative consequences of dismissal, since 
they provide laid-off workers with safeguards to ensure their material well-being and 
enable them to find new employment. Workers who receive financial benefits (passive 
labor market policies) can afford to take the time to look for jobs that match their 
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needs and qualifications and should therefore be more confident of finding new jobs of 
comparable quality. Likewise, effective placement services or re-training programs 
(active labor market policies) should make employees more optimistic. Such 
associations between labor market policies and individual action and choices has 
already be shown in previous research (e.g., Anderson, 2009). Therefore, I 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 5: More generous levels of unemployment benefits are associated 
with greater perceived employment prospects. 
 
Moreover, the generosity of unemployment benefits may affect not only 
perceived employment prospects, but also worry about job loss. Unemployment 
benefits reduce the costs of not having a job. Workers who receive unemployment 
benefits can sustain their material well-being without going to work. A vast body of 
literature in economics has consistently documented the negative relationship between 
the generosity of unemployment benefits and the duration of unemployment – mostly 
with the allegation that generous benefits make people lazy (Ehrenberg & Oaxaca, 
1976; Fredriksson & Holmlund, 2006; Katz & Meyer, 1990; Lalive, 2007; van Ours & 
Vodopivec, 2006).  In other words, if their material well-being is ensured, workers 
may not be anxious about losing their jobs. I therefore suggest that employees’ levels 
of worry surrounding job loss should be inversely proportional to their prospective 
financial situation, i.e., the higher the actual dollar amount of the wage replacement 
rate and the longer the payment of benefits, the lower the level of worry among 
workers: 
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Hypothesis 6: More generous levels of unemployment benefits are associated 
with greater affective job security. 
 
Relationships between the various facets of perceived job security 
In addition to this direct association, unemployment benefits and affective job 
security may also be indirectly related. The relationship between unemployment 
benefits and affective job security may be mediated by confidence in keeping a job or 
quickly finding a new one. Knowing that unemployment will be only a transitional state 
which will lead to a new job of comparable quality, the amount and duration of benefits 
the worker will receive in case of lay-off may actually not be as important. Therefore, I 
hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7a: Higher levels of cognitive job security are associated with higher 
affective job security. 
 
Likewise, if employees are confident of keeping their jobs, they do not need to 
worry about job loss, and their affective job security may therefore be only indirectly 
influenced by the amount of benefits they would receive in case of unemployment. 
Therefore, I hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 7b: Higher levels of perceived employment prospects are associated with 
higher affective job security. 
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In sum, according to the general argument in the comparative political 
economy and welfare state research (Hall et al., 2001b in particular), which assumes a 
straightforward impact of regulations and policies on perceptions and behavior, I 
suggest that:  
1) protection, which is best understood as an institution that reduces the power 
differential between the employee and the employer, will be associated with higher 
levels of cognitive job security and lower levels of perceived employment prospects;  
2) the proportion of temporary workers, which can be conceptualized as an 
institution that reduces relative risks and vulnerability, will also be associated with 
higher levels  of cognitive job security, as it reinforces and highlights the protection of 
permanent in comparison with non-permanent employees; 
3) unemployment benefits, which are best described as an institution that 
reduces the vulnerability of the employee in case of job loss, will be associated with 
higher levels of perceived employment prospects and affective job security; and 
4) all three types of institutions should indirectly and positively be associated 
with affective job security (mediation through cognitive job security and perceived 
employment prospects).  
Figure 4 depicts these expected relationships.  
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Figure 4: Expected Relationships between Labor Market Policies and Perceived Job 
Security 
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CHAPTER 5 
MULTILEVEL ANALYSES OF SURVEY DATTA 
 
The hypotheses in this paper are tested by applying multi-level modeling 
techniques to a data set that I created by combining individual-level data from the 
International Social Survey Program (ISSP) with country-level information from the 
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The ISSP is an 
ongoing, collaborative survey of a wide array of countries, with annually changing 
survey topics. The 2005 wave was dedicated to individuals’ “work orientations” and 
included questions on perceptions of job and employment security. The OECD 
regularly collects country-level information about the most important economic 
indicators, such as unemployment rates, social expenditures, and employment 
regulation, and standardizes the data to allow for international comparisons.  
 
Data and Methods 
Sample. By restricting the analyses to employees working at least part-time and 
to those countries for which macro-level indicators were available, the final sample 
yields a total of 12,583 observations in 20 countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, the 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. No variable used in the analyses has more than five 
percent missing data. 
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Dependent variables. The three dependent variables which capture confidence 
and positive expectations regarding future employment prospects are cognitive job 
security, perceived employment prospects, and affective job security and have been 
drawn from the ISSP. To assess cognitive job security, respondents were asked how 
much they agreed or disagreed with the statement that their jobs were “secure;” answer 
categories ranged from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 5 (“strongly agree”). To assess 
affective job security, respondents were asked to what extent they worried “about the 
possibility of losing [their] job;” answer categories ranged from 1 (“worry a great 
deal”) to 4 (“don’t worry at all”). To assess perceived employment prospects, 
respondents were asked to indicate how difficult or easy it would be for them to “find a 
job at least as good as [their] current one;” answer categories ranged from 1 (“very 
difficult”) to 5 (“very easy”).6 Figure 5 shows the proportion of respondents with high 
and very high perceived job security by country, i.e., those who selected the two 
highest categories for the various questions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
6 A sixth answer category, “can’t choose,” in the questions assessing cognitive job security and 
perceived labor market security was coded as missing data. 
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Figure 5: Weighted Proportions of Employees with High Levels of Perceived Job 
Security in Study Countries in 2005 
 
Note: IE (Ireland), DK (Denmark), US (United States), ES (Spain), GB (Great Britain), CH 
(Switzerland), CA (Canada), BE (Belgium), SE (Sweden), DE (Germany), AU (Australia), NL (The 
Netherlands), NO (Norway), PT (Portugal), FI (Finland), JP (Japan), HU (Hungary), CZ (Czech 
Republic), FR (France), KR (Korea), Source: OECD @ stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
This overview shows the variation that exists among the respondents in the 
various countries. While 74 percent of the employees in Ireland are confident that they 
will keep their jobs, those in South Korea tend to be pessimistic; only around 38 
percent believe that their jobs are secure. For the other two facets of perceived job 
security, the variation across countries is similar if not greater. For example, 44 
percent of the employees in the U.S. are confident that they will quickly find a job of 
comparable quality in case of lay-off, while not even ten percent of the workers in 
Germany exhibit equal optimism. Likewise, nearly 90 percent of the employees in 
Denmark, Belgium, and the U.S. are not worried about a potential job loss, whereas 
the proportion of non-worried workers in Spain is only around 53 percent. 
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Independent variables. The strength of dismissal protection captures the 
reduction in power differentials between the employee and the employer across 
countries. This is an OECD indicator, which includes the protection of individual 
workers against dismissal, special requirements for collective dismissals, and the 
regulation of temporary forms of employment. While the first two components consist 
mainly of legislative provisions, procedural inconveniences, notice, severance 
payments, and the definition of the conditions under which dismissal is considered 
”fair“ or ”justified“, the last refers to national restrictions on the use of temporary 
employment (OECD, 2004: 65). Figure 6 shows the strength of the OECD dismissal 
protection indicator for my sample countries. 
 
Figure 6: Strength of Dismissal Protection in Study Countries in 2005 
 
Note: US (United States), GB (Great Britain), CA (Canada), IE (Ireland), CH (Switzerland), AU 
(Australia), JP (Japan), DK (Denmark), HU (Hungary), FI (Finland), KR (South Korea), CZ (Czech 
Republic), DE (Germany), NL (The Netherlands), BE (Belgium), SE (Sweden), NO (Norway), ES 
(Spain), FR (France), PT (Portugal), Source: OECD @ stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
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The proportion of temporary workers in a country’s total workforce captures 
the relative protection against job loss and relative vulnerability of permanent 
employees in comparison to temporary employees. The percentage of temporary 
workers ranges from 2.5 percent in Ireland to 36.1 in South Korea. This measure is 
also drawn from the OECD. Figure 7 shows the proportion of temporary workers in 
the total workforce for my sample countries. 
 
Figure 7: Proportion of Temporary Workers in Study Countries in 2005 
Note: IE (Ireland), US (United States), AU (Australia), GB (Great Britain), HU (Hungary), CZ (Czech 
Republic), BE (Belgium), NO (Norway), DK (Denmark), , CH (Switzerland), CA (Canada), FR 
(France), DE (Germany), JP (Japan), SE (Sweden), FI (Finland), PT (Portugal), ES (Spain), KR (South 
Korea), Source: OECD @ stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
 
The generosity of unemployment benefits captures the degree to which the 
employee’s vulnerability is reduced in case of job loss. In this paper, unemployment 
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benefits are measured as the expenditure per head on a) passive labor market policies, 
i.e., the material assistance workers receive in case of lay-off, and b) active labor 
market policies, i.e., those government-provided services intended to increase the 
quality of the labor supply through training, job creation, and assistance in finding new 
jobs (in U.S. dollars, constant prices, and PPPs 2000). This measure is given in 
expenditure per head, i.e., the benefits per unemployed worker, and shown in Figure 
87.  
 
Figure 8: Spending on Unemployment in Study Countries in 2005 
 
Note: KR (South Korea), HU (Hungary), US (United States), CZ (Czech Republic), JP (Japan), GB 
(Great Britain), AU (Australia), CA (Canada), PT (Portugal), NO (Norway), IE (Ireland), CH 
(Switzerland), ES (Spain), FR (France), DE (Germany), SE (Sweden), FI (Finland), NL (The 
Netherlands), BE (Belgium), DK (Denmark), Source: OECD @ stats.oecd.org/index.aspx 
                                                
7 By using the expenditure on unemployment benefits per unemployed person rather than the 
expenditure in percentage GDP (as other studies have done, e.g., Anderson and Pontusson, 2007 or 
Kittel and Obinger, 2003), my measure captures the actual generosity of the benefits, rather than a high 
number of unemployed or a low GDP.  
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Control variables. Because employees may still expect to lose their jobs 
despite strong dismissal protection, and because they may still not be confident about 
quickly finding new employment and worry about what will happen to them despite 
generous unemployment benefits, the analyses account for alternative explanations by 
including a number of control variables. At the individual level, these are gender, 
marital status/cohabitation, children, age, education, participation in training, use of 
skills at the current job, public sector employment, union membership, occupational 
status, reduced working hours, the quality of relationships with colleagues and 
management, and being in a supervisory position. At the country level, these are the 
standardized unemployment rates averaged over the last five years; positive labor 
market trends; and Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance indicator (2001), which assesses 
country-specific differences regarding emotional needs for formal rules, predictability, 
or regulated planning and organizations.8 A detailed description of all the variables is 
provided in Table 3; the means, standard deviations, and correlations between all 
variables are displayed in Table 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
8 While more contextual factors could be relevant in explaining differences among countries, such as a 
measure of the openness of the national economy or growth rates, the available degrees of freedom on 
level 2 (N = 20) and therefore the use of contextual variables is fairly limited. 
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Table 3: Detailed Description of Study Variables 
Variable Name Description 
Cognitive Job 
Security 
For each of these statements about your (main) job, please tick 
one box to show how much you agree or disagree that it applies 
to your job. My job is secure. 
1 – Strongly disagree to 5 – strongly agree 
Affective Job 
Security 
To what extent, if at all, do you worry about the 
possibility of losing your job? 
1 –I worry a great deal to 4 – I don’t worry at 
all 
Perceived 
Employment 
Security 
How difficult or easy do you think it would be for you to find a 
job at least as good as your current one? 
1 – very difficult to 5 – very easy 
Gender 1 – being female 
0 – otherwise 
Single 1 – being single 
0 – being married or living with partner 
Young 1 – being ≤ 30 years 
0 – otherwise 
Old  1 – ≥ 50 years  
Degree 1 – no formal qualification 
2 – lowest formal qualification 
3 – above lowest qualification 
4 – higher secondary completed 
5 – above higher secondary level  
6 – university degree completed 
Occupation Four dummy variables based on ISCO88 classification 
- Managers and Professionals 
- Service Workers (reference category) 
- Manual Workers 
- Elementary Occupations 
Work Time 1 – employed-full time 
2 – employed-part time  
3 – employed < part-time 
Union Member 1 – being a union member 
0 – otherwise 
Supervisory 
Position 
1 – being in a supervisory position 
0 – otherwise 
Participation in 
Training 
1 – received training to improve job skills over past 12 months 
0 – otherwise 
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Use of Skills 1 – almost no use of past work experience and skills 
2 – a little use of past work experience and skills 
3 – a lot use of past work experience and skills 
4 –  almost all use of past work experience and skills 
Relations with 
Management 
1 – relations between management and employees are very bad 
2 –  relations between management and employees are bad 
3 –  relations between management and employees are neither 
good nor bad 
4 –  relations between management and employees are good 
5 –  relations between management and employees are very good 
Relations with 
Colleagues 
1 – relations between colleagues/workmates are very bad 
2 –  relations between colleagues/workmates are bad 
3 –  relations between colleagues/workmates are neither nor 
4 –  relations between colleagues/workmates are good 
5 –  relations between colleagues/workmates are very good 
Ø Unempl. Rate Average of harmonized unemployment rates from 2000 to 2005  
Source: OECD at http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx  
Decrease in 
Unemployment 
Rates 
1 – decrease in unemployment rates from 2004 to 2005 
0 – increase in/stagnation of unemployment rates from 2004 to 
2005 
Spending on 
Unemployment  
 
Expenditure on active and passive labor market policies, in 
expenditure per head in US dollars (constant prices and PPPs, 
2000) 
Source:  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx  
Dismissal 
Protection 
OECD provided indicator encompassing the protection of 
individual workers against dismissal and special requirements for 
collective dismissals, as well as the regulation of temporary forms 
of employment. While the first two components consist mainly of 
legislative provisions, procedural inconveniences, notice, 
severance payments, and definition of the conditions under which 
dismissal is considered “fair” or “justified;” the last refers to 
national restrictions on the use of temporary employment 
Source: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx . 
Uncertainty 
Avoidance 
 
A survey-based indicator capturing the extent to which ambiguous 
situations are perceived as threats, rules or orders are preferred, 
and uncertainty is tolerated within a society; higher scores indicate 
greater uncertainty avoidance  
Source: http://www.geert-hofstede.com/hofstede_dimensions.php . 
Proportion of 
Temporary 
Workers 
Proportion of temporary employment at total employed workforce 
Source:  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx  
  
    Table 4:  Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among Study Variables  
   N = 12,583 
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Analyses 
Because the analyses seek to examine differences across countries and to 
combine individual-level with national-level data, I utilize multilevel models. Ignoring 
the nested structure of the data would lead to underestimated standard errors and 
erroneous conclusions about the statistical significance of relationships between the 
study variables (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2005). I chose to estimate linear 
coefficient models for all three dependent variables using the maximum likelihood 
estimator (ML)9. The model takes the following form:  
 
 , where 
 
 
 Yij  captures perceived job/employment security for individual i in  
country j 
Xij is the individual level characteristics for the individual i in  
country j 
 Zj is the country level characteristics for country j 
 ß0  is the overall intercept 
 ßk  is the fixed individual-level parameters 
 ßk  is the fixed country-level parameters 
 u0j  is the country-specific deviation from the overall intercept 
 εij  is the residual for the ith individual in country j. 
 
Robustness Checks 
To check the robustness of the results of the random intercept models, I also 
conducted analyses using clustered regression models and random coefficient models 
                                                
9 Using ML allows me to compare the model fit based on the χ2-test of deviances (which is not always 
the case for models based on the restricted likelihood estimator). Stata’s ‘xtmixed’ command is used to 
estimate these models (version 11). 
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with age, gender, and education as random effects.10 The results of these analyses, 
which are presented in the Appendix, do yield similar results for all the individual and 
country-level predictors used in this paper, i.e., differences in the size of the 
coefficients and their level of statistical significance, but no differences in the signs of 
the coefficients were detected. 
To test for multicollinearity, I ran an OLS regression on country-level averages 
with only macro-level variables as predictors but did not find any indication of a 
problem when examining the variance inflation factors associated with these models 
(no values higher than 2.85). 
To ensure that the results are not driven by those countries with a high number 
of observations (the ISSP data are unbalanced, i.e., the number of observations among 
countries varies between 431 and 1,076), I compare the results based on the maximum 
likelihood estimator to those based on the restricted maximum likelihood estimator 
(REML). The results between the two estimation methods do not differ substantially, 
i.e., slight differences in the size of some of the coefficients and level of significances 
but no changes in the signs of the coefficients nor in the statistical significances 
(results available upon request).11  
To check that the results are not driven by a single group of countries, e.g., 
Eastern Europe, I also conducted analyses without these countries. Here again, the 
                                                
10 Comparative labor market research has shown that age, gender, and education are associated with 
different income levels and unemployment risks in different countries (Esping-Andersen & Regini, 
2000; Lindbeck & Snower, 2001). Other individual level variables are not considered random effects 
because of the limited degrees of freedom due to a small country-level N of 20. 
11 While REML and ML produce the same results when using balanced data, their estimators can differ 
when using unbalanced data, since the REML estimates for the random intercept variance take the loss 
of one degree of freedom into account because an overall mean is estimated, while ML does not. A 
variance component model using ML, in contrast, produces a weighted mean of the clustered mean, i.e., 
gives more weight to groups with fewer observations. 
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results did not differ substantially from those I obtained using the full sample (i.e., 20 
countries instead of only 18). The results of these analyses based on subgroups of 
countries are also available upon request. 
 
Results 
Table 5 presents the results of the analyses with individual-level predictors 
only. Tables 6 to 9 summarize the analyses of each of the three dependent variables. 
The first model in each table includes only the intercept. Based on this empty model, I 
calculate the intra-class correlation ρ (ICC), which indicates how much of the variance 
in the dependent variable is due to differences between individuals as opposed to 
differences between countries.12 The second column in each table (Model 2) presents 
the model with all control variables on the individual and country-level. The 
predicting variables for the hypothesized relationships are introduced sequentially. 
The evidence for and against each hypothesis is discussed separately for each of the 
three dependent variables. 
 
Individual-level characteristics and perceived job security 
Table 5 displays the results of the analyses for cognitive job security (Column 
1), perceived employment prospects (Column 2), and affective job security (Column 
3). Looking at the demographic characteristics, we observe that gender (1 being 
female) has a negative association with perceived employment prospects and affective 
job security (α < 0.01) and that being single has a negative association with cognitive 
and affective job security (α < 0.05) but a positive association with perceived 
employment prospects (α < 0.05). We also observe considerable differences between 
                                                
12 The ICC is calculated by dividing the variance at the country level (u2) by the total variance, i.e., the 
sum of the country-level variance and the residual variance (u2+ εi2). 
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the different age groups. Young workers (< = 30 years) not only tend to be more 
optimistic about keeping their jobs and quickly finding new ones in case of 
unemployment, but also tend to be less worried about job loss than their older 
counterparts (α < 0.01/0.001). Older workers (>= 50 years), in contrast, exhibit lower 
levels of perceived employment prospects (α < 0.001) but also tend to be less worried 
(α < 0.05) about job loss than those between 31 and 49 years (reference category).  
Turning to education, we again observe that the three facets of perceived job 
security are not affected equally by all of the independent variables. Higher levels of 
education are not associated with greater cognitive job security but do have a positive 
and statistically significant association with both perceived employment prospects (α 
< 0.01) and affective job security (α < 0.001). Participation in training during the last 
12 months is positively associated with cognitive and affective job security (α < 
0.001) but (somewhat surprisingly) not with perceived employment prospects. One 
reason for this lack of statistical significance may be that at least some of the 
employees’ training is firm-specific and therefore of use only for their current position 
but not for jobs outside their organization. This suspicion is backed up by the fact that 
using one’s skills and qualifications in the current job is positively associated with all 
three dependent variables (α < 0.001). 
Public sector employees and union members tend to be relatively more 
confident about keeping their jobs (positive coefficient for cognitive job security, α < 
0.001) but less optimistic about quickly finding a new job of comparable quality in 
case of job loss (negative coefficient for perceived employment prospects, α < 0.001). 
While public service sector employees are not worried about losing their jobs (positive 
coefficient for affective job security, α < 0.001), union members tend to be anxious 
about this prospect (negative coefficient for affective job security, α < 0.001).  
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Occupational membership also affects individuals’ perceptions of job security. 
Workers in manufacturing and agricultural jobs are not only less confident about 
keeping their jobs (negative coefficient for cognitive job security, α < 0.05) but also 
more worried about job loss (negative coefficient for affective job security, α < 0.01) 
than service workers (reference category). The general decline in jobs in the 
manufacturing and agricultural sectors, as well as the relocation of manual jobs to 
low-wage countries, may cause these workers’ pessimistic view of their future 
employment chances. Workers in elementary occupations13, in contrast, tend to be 
more optimistic about finding a new job than service workers (positive coefficient for 
perceived employment prospects, α < 0.001) but worry more about job loss (negative 
coefficient for affective job security, α < 0.001), probably because their dependence 
on a steady income is high, given the low wages they earn.  
The actual working situation also seems to matter for workers’ confidence 
about their future job situation. Working fewer hours (1=full time, 2=substantial part-
time, and 3= marginal part-time) are associated with lower levels of cognitive job 
security (α < 0.001) but also with greater perceived employment prospects and greater 
affective job security (α < 0.01). Part-time workers may perceive themselves as easier 
to replace than full-time workers, but since they are often not the main breadwinners 
in the household, they are also less dependent on their jobs and hence less worried. In 
addition, they may also have lower expectations vis-à-vis their work, which can 
explain why they are more optimistic about finding a job of similar quality. Being in a 
supervisory position and having good relationships with management and colleagues 
do not affect workers’ perceived employment prospects, whereas both of these 
                                                
13 These are occupations that require the knowledge and skills to perform only very simple, routine 
tasks and limited personal initiative or judgment, e.g., selling goods on the street, doorkeeping and 
property watching, cleaning, or laboring in mining, agriculture and fishing, construction and 
manufacturing (IL0 1990). 
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variables have a positive association with cognitive job security (α < 0.001) and 
affective job security (α < 0.001).  
 
able 5: Random Intercept Models on Perceived Job Security 
 
  Note: The significant coefficients are marked with † for p < 0.1, * for p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, and *** p < 
0.001.  
The Group variable is country code. Since the variable “public sector employment” is not available for 
the U.S., I tested whether the exclusion of the U.S. yielded different results. Since this was not the case, I 
included the U.S. in all of the following analyses.  
N (Level 1) = 12,583 
N (Level 2) = 20 
 
  56 
 In sum, the individual-level variables do not yield any surprising associations 
with any of the dependent variables and are in line with what previous studies have 
shown (Anderson et al., 2007; Ashford et al., 1989; Bender et al., 1999; De Witte, 
2005; Sverke et al., 2002).  
 
Dismissal protection, temporary workers, and cognitive job security 
 Table 6 displays the findings on cognitive job security, i.e., individuals’ 
confidence in keeping their jobs. The low intraclass correlation coefficient of 0.023 as 
shown in Model 1 suggests that dismissal protection – along with other contextual 
factors – has only a slight impact on employees’ cognitive job security. Only 2.3 
percent of the variance in cognitive job security can be explained by differences 
between countries. Put differently, the correlation of cognitive job security between 
two randomly selected individuals in the same country is only 0.023, even though their 
working conditions are determined by the same economic environment and their 
employment contracts are based on the same labor market regulations. This initial 
finding provides very little evidence for the presumption that differences in skill-
formation systems and national business strategies can be attributed to institutional 
variations.  
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   Table 6: Random Intercept Models on Cognitive Job Security 
 
  Note: The significant coefficients are marked with † for p < 0.1, * for p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, and *** p < 
0.001.  
The group variable is country code.  
To compare the model fit, χ2–tests deviance (=-2LogDeviance) were conducted14. These tests indicate 
that Model 2 fits the data better than Mode1  (p < 0.001) and that Model 5 fits the data better than 
Model 4 (p<0.001).  
N (Level 1) = 12,583 
N (Level 2) = 20 
 
Model 2 includes all individual and macro-level control variables. The only 
statistically significant variable on the country level is the decrease in unemployment. 
                                                
14 Smaller deviances indicate better model fit. The χ2–value is calculated on the difference between the 
deviances of two models; the degrees of freedom are the differences in the number of parameters 
between the models. 
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Declining unemployment rates thus seem to make workers more optimistic about 
keeping their jobs. In Models 3 to 5, Hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 are tested. Hypothesis 1, 
which posits that higher levels of dismissal protection will be associated with higher 
levels of cognitive job security, is not confirmed (Model 3). The relationship between 
strength of dismissal protection and cognitive job security is statistically insignificant. 
There is likewise no statistically significant relationship between the proportion of 
temporary workers and cognitive job security (Model 4), as suggested by Hypothesis 
3. Hypothesis 4, however, which predicts that the joint effect of stringent dismissal 
protection and a high proportion of temporary workers will yield even higher levels of 
cognitive job security, is confirmed (Model 5).15 The coefficients of dismissal 
protection and the proportion of temporary workers are negative, while the coefficient 
of their interaction term is positive.  
In substantive terms, this means that stringent dismissal protection is likely to 
exhibit its protective psychological effects only in those countries with a high 
proportion of temporary workers. This effect is depicted graphically in Figures 9a and 
9b. Figure 9a shows the slopes of the interaction term; Figure 9b shows the 
relationship between dismissal protection and cognitive job security when the 
proportion of temporary workers is below (left side) and above (right side) the sample 
mean. Only in their joint presence do stringent dismissal protection and the presence 
of temporary workers have a statistically significant effect. In tandem, they make 
employees confident of keeping their jobs.  
 
 
                                                
15 In order to determine the “practical relevance” of this result, I also examined the effect size of the 
standardized coefficients. The standardized coefficient of the interaction term between the strength of 
dismissal protection and the proportion of temporary workers is 0.089 and is thus the third highest 
coefficient in the analyses. Only the ‘public service employment’ (0.126) and ‘relations with 
management’ are higher. The fourth most important predictor is ‘uncertainty avoidance’ (0.072), and 
the fifth most important ‘participation in training’. The standardized coefficients for all of the analyses 
are presented in the Appendix. 
  
Figure 9a: Interaction Effect between Strength of Dismissal 
Protection and Proportion of Temporary Workers for Cognitive 
Job Security 
 
Figure 9b: Association between Strength of Dismissal 
Protection  
and Cognitive Job Security by Proportion of Temporary 
Workers 
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To ensure that these results are not skewed by those countries with very high 
proportions of individuals working on temporary contracts, I also ran additional 
analyses which excluded the two countries with the highest proportion of employees 
working on temporary contracts, South Korea, with 36.12 percent temporary workers 
and Spain, with 33.26 percent. The exclusion of these two countries, however, changes 
only the magnitude but not the sign and the statistical significance of the coefficient of 
the interaction term, as shown in Table 7 below (the slight decrease in statistical 
significance from p < 0.05 to p = 0.06 is likely to be due to the reduction in the 
degrees of freedom by having a smaller number of observations at the country level).  
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Table 7: Random Intercept Models on Cognitive Job Security without Spain and South 
Korea  
 
  Note: The significant coefficients are marked with † for p <0.1, * for p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, and *** p < 
0.001. The Group variable is country code.  
  To compare the model fit, χ2–tests deviance (=-2LogDeviance) were conducted. These tests indicate 
that Model 2 fits the data better than Model 1 (p < 0.001, that Model 4 fits the data better than Model 3  
(p< 0.05; and that Model 6 fits the data better than Model 5 (p < 0.1).  
N (Level 1) = 11,973 
N (Level 2) = 18 
 
 62 
Dismissal Protection, unemployment benefits, and perceived employment prospects 
Table 8 presents the analyses of perceived employment prospects. The ICC 
calculated from the empty model is 0.058, suggesting that the contextual factors 
matter more for employees’ perceived employment prospects than for their cognitive 
job security. Model 2, which includes all control variables, also fails to yield any 
unexpected relationships. Only two of the country-level control variables – Hofstede’s 
uncertainty avoidance index (negative coefficient) and a decrease in unemployment 
(positive coefficient) – are statistically significant. Positive labor market trends thus 
make employees more optimistic of finding new jobs of comparable quality in case of 
job loss, while employees in countries with a greater aversion to uncertainty tend to 
have lower expectations of adequate re-employment.  
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Table 8: Random Intercept Models on Perceived Employment Prospects 
 
Note: The significant coefficients are marked with † for p <0.1, * for p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, and *** p < 
0.001. The group variable is country code.  
To compare the model fit, χ2–tests deviance (=-2LogDeviance) were conducted. These tests indicate 
that Model 2 fits the data better than Model 1 (p < 0.001) but do not show any statistical significance 
differences between Model 4, Model 3 and Model 2.  
N (Level 1) = 12,583 
N (Level 2) = 20 
 
Hypothesis 2, which suggests that more stringent levels of dismissal protection 
inadvertently have a negative effect on workers’ perceived employment prospects, is 
not confirmed. Hypothesis 5, which suggests that high expenditures on unemployment 
benefits – be they passive labor market policies, which allow individuals to take their 
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time to look for jobs that match their qualifications and needs, or active labor market 
policies, which support them in their job search through training and placement 
services – are associated with greater perceived employment prospects, is likewise not 
supported. The coefficient is positive, i.e., points in the expected direction, but is not 
statistically significant at p < 0.05. One explanation for this lack of statistical 
significance is that the measure is too coarse to actually capture the assurance function 
of unemployment benefits16. In many countries the generosity of unemployment 
benefits depends on individuals’ previous income and not all employees fulfill the 
eligibility criteria to receive the benefits. For example, because they have not been 
working long enough or because specific benefits, especially active labor market 
policies, are targeted only towards particular groups, such as old or young workers. 
In terms of “practical relevance”, the results based on the standardized 
variables (Table provided in the Appendix) show that the importance of 
unemployment benefits for perceived employment prospects in comparison with the 
other factors is relatively low. The standardized coefficient of ‘unemployment 
benefits’ is “only” 0.024, whereas the two age variables (coefficient of ‘ ≤30 yrs.’ 
being 0. 080 and ‘≥ 50 yrs.’ being -0.129), decrease in unemployment (0.090), and 
‘uncertainty avoidance’ (-0.151) carry a much higher weight.  
 
                                                
16 With any of the other commonly used measures of unemployment benefits (see Footnote 7 for a 
detailed description), the results neither change nor become statistically significant. 
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Unemployment benefits and affective job security 
The results for affective job security are presented in Table 9. For affective job 
security, i.e., the degree to which individuals are not worried about potential job loss, 
country-level characteristics are even more important than they are for cognitive job 
security and perceived employment prospects. The intraclass correlation value of 
0.084, calculated from the empty model, indicates that contextual factors significantly 
influence whether workers are worried about potential job loss. Similar to what was 
shown in the previous tables, the inclusion of all the control variables in Model 2 does 
not yield any surprises. The coefficients of all country-level variables point in the 
expected direction. However, none of the coefficients are statistically significant with 
an α-level of at least 0.05.  
On the other hand, Model 3 shows that the relationship between the generosity 
of unemployment benefits and affective job security, as presumed by Hypothesis 6, is 
positive and statistically significant at the p < 0.001-threshold. This suggests that 
institutions indeed instill confidence and positive expectations by reducing 
vulnerability and providing assurance. The examination of the standardized coefficient 
of unemployment benefits (Model 2 in Table “Standardized Values of Affective Job 
Security, provided in the Appendix) also indicates the practical importance of this type 
of labor market institution. With a standardized coefficient of 0.161, unemployment 
benefits are more important than any other individual or country level variable in 
reducing workers’ worries about job loss  
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Table 9: Random Intercept Models on Affective Job Security 
 
Note: The significant coefficients are marked with † for p <0.1, * for p < 0.05,** p < 0.01, and *** p < 
0.001. The group variable is country code.  
To compare the model fit, χ2–tests deviance (=-2LogDeviance) were conducted. These tests indicate 
that the model fit steadily increases from Model 1 to Model 4 (p < 0.001). 
N (Level 1) = 12,583 
N (Level 2) = 20 
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Relationships between the various facets of perceived job security 
 
In Model 4, cognitive job security and perceived employment prospects were 
added as additional individual-level predictors. The coefficients of both variables have 
positive and statistically significant signs, thus confirming Hypothesis 7a and 
Hypothesis 7b. In other words, cognitive job security, which is heavily influenced by 
the strength of dismissal protection and the proportion of temporary workers in a given 
country, reduces worry about job loss, since the job is actually not endangered. In 
addition, high levels of perceived employment prospects, potentially influenced by the 
generosity of unemployment benefits, reduces worry about job loss because 
employees are aware of potential alternatives, knowing that they can easily find new 
jobs. 
The examination of the standardized coefficients of these variables (Table 
provided in the Appendix) underscores the practical relevance of these factors to 
affective job security. The standardized coefficient of cognitive job security is 0.369, 
and that of perceived employment prospects 0.115. These perceptions are as important 
as the generosity of unemployment benefits (value of standardized coefficient is 
0.138) in reducing workers’ worries about job loss. 
Although the findings of these internationally comparative analyses are in 
agreement with earlier studies on European labor markets (Clark et al., 2009; 
Erlinghagen, 2008; Postel-Vinay & Saint-Martin, 2004; Sousa-Poza, 2004), they are 
are still puzzling. One potential explanation is that employees do not have sufficient 
knowledge of the institutions underlying their employment contracts or may not 
believe that what is “written in the books” is actually acted on in practice (Zylan & 
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Soule, 2000). In order to generate confidence and positive expectations, institutions 
need to be trusted and considered capable of doing what they were designed to do. In 
an environment characterized by a high degree of volatility and economic uncertainty, 
people may not believe that formal policies such as dismissal protection are actually 
able to protect them from the distortions of capitalist markets – unless there is a 
population that fares considerably worse than they do themselves.  
The results may, moreover, be due to legal and economic changes over time. 
Trust in the potency of national dismissal protection may have faded in recent years 
(OECD Stats 2009). This assumption is backed up by one study of the ISSP data from 
1997 (Anderson and Pontusson 2007)17, which shows that in the mid-1990s high 
levels of dismissal protection were indeed associated with greater cognitive job 
security. In addition to arguing that employees have lost confidence in the institutions 
meant to protect them against the arbitrariness of those with more power, it might also 
be that employees in countries with low dismissal protection (liberal market 
economies) may overestimate what “their” labor market institutions are actually 
capable of doing or what they are meant to do. For the U.S., Roehling and Boswell 
(2004) have shown that despite explicit at-will policies, employees believe that their 
employers are obligated to have a good reason to discharge them. The terms of the 
“psychological contract” (Rousseau, 1995) may hence be more important for 
individuals’ perceptions and expectations than the terms of the written agreement. 
One general conclusion that can be drawn from the analyses of the relationship 
between dismissal protection and cognitive job security, and thus for institutions that 
                                                
17 My findings on the 2005 wave differ from those of Anderson and Pontusson (2007), even if I use the 
exact same methods of analyses and variables.  
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reduce power differentials between unequal exchange partners, is that comparisons 
matter. Comparing the current to the previous situation, or one’s own situation to those 
of others, tends to affect self-evaluation, as studies of relative deprivation have shown  
in various contexts (e.g., Crosby, 1982; Stouffer, 1949). When individuals become 
accustomed to high standards of job security, even slight deteriorations in the level of 
protection – as has occurred in many European countries – may reduce their trust in 
these institutions and may have unsettling effects.  
In sum, my results partly challenge the rationality assumption underlying the 
large bulk of comparative literature on welfare states and capitalist economies as 
promoted by Hall and Soskice, at al. (2001), among others. These scholars cite the 
stringency of dismissal protection and the generosity of unemployment benefits as the 
main explanation for different skill production systems and national business models. 
However, if these labor market institutions do not provide workers with the confidence 
that they will keep their jobs, as my preliminary analyses suggest, why should 
employees and employers be willing to invest in firm-specific skills, which is risky 
and costly for both parties? The findings of this first part of the study thus require 
further investigation and motivate the second empirical chapter of my dissertation.  
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CHAPTER 6 
ANALSES OF IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
 
To refine these quantitative analyses and to be better able to interpret the 
findings of this first empirical study, I analyze interview data that I collected from 46 
university employees in Germany and the U.S. in a second study. Germany and the 
U.S. exhibit great differences in their labor market institutions and have therefore been 
juxtaposed as the two ideal types of market economies (Hall et al., 2001b) – 
coordinated market economies, on the one hand, and liberal market economies, on the 
other. Universities, moreover, are an ideal organizational setting in which to study the 
relationship between formal institutions and perceptions of job security. They employ 
a wide range of occupational groups (administrators, researchers, physical plant 
workers, professors, etc.) and hire their personnel on various types of employment 
contracts, while having similar missions and using similar technologies across 
countries (Clark, 1983, 1987).18 
The main findings from the qualitative analyses are that (1) employees clearly 
distinguish between the different facets of perceived job security (i.e., cognitive job 
security, perceived labor market prospects, and affective job security); (2) individual 
and organizational-level characteristics are far more important for employees’ feelings 
of job security than national-level institutions; (3) employees’ knowledge about these 
institutions and policies seems to be fairly limited, in particular knowledge about 
                                                
18 Since the subject of “job security” is always delicate in the eyes of HR representatives, the question 
of access guided my choice of sites. 
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dismissal protection; and (4) employees actively manufacture for themselves feelings 
of job security, which is crucial for their well-being and the sine qua non for them to 
be able to perform their jobs. Depending on their personal situations, these strategies 
range from relying on the organization’s implicit promise of rewarding loyalty and 
commitment with job security to making themselves indispensable to the functioning 
of the organization. These findings will be presented in greater detail after a 
description of the data and their collection. 
 
Data and methods 
Sample. The data for my two case studies come from two well-established 
universities in Germany and the U.S. Both are relatively large research institutions, 
located in the eastern part of their respective countries. While the campus of the 
German university is located in a major metropolitan area, the main campus of the 
U.S. university is in a rural area. The data were collected between January and August, 
2010. Using the organizational directory, personal connections, recommendations, and 
snowballing, I identified approximately 30 interview partners at both universities, 
whom I subsequently interviewed in person.19 
The interviewees at the German university were drawn from various colleges 
and administrative departments, as well as dining halls and cleaning services, which 
actually do not belong to the university directly but are run by independent 
contractors, whereas the interviewees in the U.S. all came from the same unit (albeit 
                                                
19 One interview was conducted via Skype. 
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one with multiple academic and administrative departments) due to problems of data 
access.  
The final sample consisted of a total of 46 individuals20, 26 of whom were 
female. The youngest interviewee was 18 years old and the oldest above retirement 
age, which is 65 years in Germany and 67 years in the U.S.21 The mean age was 44. 
Twenty-five of my interviewees had at least a Master’s degree, nine had high school 
degrees or were high school dropouts; the remaining 12 had completed a Bachelor 
degree or vocational training. Thirty-five of the respondents had children; 34 were 
married, engaged, or living with a steady partner. The person with the lowest tenure 
had been employed at the university for 1.5 years; the person with the longest for more 
than 30 years (average tenure was 11.78 years).  
To ensure confidentiality, only the most basic demographic information is 
provided when I cite from the interviews, i.e., gender, job/occupational status, and 
research location (Germany vs. U.S.). The various types of jobs and occupations are 
summarized into four occupational categories, which are cleaner/facility 
manager/technician (C/FM/T), administrative assistant (AA), assistant 
director/director (AD/D), and research associate/lecturer/untenured faculty 
(RA/L/UF). Moreover, I forgo the information on whether the interviewee is from 
Germany or the U.S. whenever this detail might make it possible for a third party to 
                                                
20 Ten employees did not respond to my request to conduct an interview with them; one person did not 
sign the consent form; the quality of the taping of three interviews was too poor to be transcribed and 
my notes were insufficient for a proper analysis. 
21 In the US, the “normal retirement age” (NRA) is 67. However, the initial receipt of the pension may 
be deferred. Credit is given for deferment up to the age of 70 (OECD 2011; 
http://www.ssa.gov/OACT/ProgData/nra.html).  
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identify the respondent. An overview of the demographic characteristics of my 
interviewees is provided in Table 10. 
 
 Table 10: Summary of Interviewees’ Demographic Characteristics 
 American University German University 
Duration of 
Interview Average of 48 min Average of 109 min 
Gender 37% male, 63% female 50% male, 50 % female 
Age Average of 46 years Average of 41 years 
Education 
23, 5  % high school or less  
20 % BA or associate degree 
30 % Master or LLM 
23,5 % PhD 
8 % high school or less  
35 % Vocational training 
42 % Master 
15 % PhD 
Tenure Average of 11 years Average of 14 years 
Children  87% have children 64% have children 
Marital Status 
67 % married, engaged, or 
living with a steady partner 
33 % single or divorced 
72% married, engaged, or living 
with a steady partner 
28% single or divorced 
Organizational 
Rank 
10% cleaners/facility 
managers/technicians (C/FM/T)  
43% administrative assistants 
(AA)  
30% assistant directors/directors 
(AD/D)  
16% researchers/lecturers 
(RA/L/UF) 
35% cleaners/facility 
managers/technicians (C/FM/T)  
35% administrative assistants 
(AA)  
21% assistant directors/directors 
(AD/D)  
7% researchers/lecturers 
(RA/L/UF) 
 
Research site 1. The German university is located in the former East Germany 
and has around 30,000 students and 5,000 employees, of whom 400 are tenured 
professors and 1,800 untenured academic faculty. Cleaning services and dining are 
outsourced to external providers. After German reunification, the university underwent 
a major restructuring process (for a general overview on reunification politics see 
Anderson, Kaltenthaler, & Luthardt, 1993; and for the transformation East German 
education system see Reuter, 1993). Between 1990 and 1994, more than 3,000 
 74 
employees quit the university. They either went into early retirement or were laid off 
as part of the organizational restructuring process that occurred due to financial 
concerns and the university’s new political orientation. Departments conducting 
research on Marxism/Leninism had become obsolete and study programs needed to be 
coordinated with other public universities in the area.  
In January 2010, the time during which I started collecting my interview data, 
an important clause in the collective bargaining agreement for the non-academic staff 
expired. This clause had prohibited “organization-related” dismissals between April 1, 
2004 to January 1, 2010, i.e., lay-offs for structural or economic reasons.22 Despite this 
reduction in their actual protection against lay-offs, university employees at the 
German research site still cannot be easily dismissed. Like any other employee in 
Germany, they can be laid off only for good reasons, which include personal 
deficiencies, such as health problems or lack of ability; individual misconduct, such as 
stealing or disclosure of organizational secrets; and now also economic and 
commercial reasons, such as decreases in orders or the need to down-size (Pfarr et al., 
2005). In case of a dismissal, employers must respect a notice period23, provide a 
justification, and obtain the approval of the organization’s works council (if there is 
one) 24. If the dismissal is justified by economic or commercial factors, social criteria 
need to be considered when deciding who leaves the organization (ibid.) 
                                                
2222 This information was retrieved from the university’s website and in background conversations with 
university representatives. 
23 These can range from one month for employees who have been with the organization for two years to 
up to seven months for employees with 20 or more years of tenure.  
24 A works council is the German "shop-floor" organization which represents employees and 
complements sectoral collective bargaining agreements. In organizations with more than five 
employees, workers have the right to elect a works council. The works council is involved in any hiring 
and firing decisions and needs to be informed about the organization’s economic decisions. 
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Although there are no reliable figures on the lay-offs occurring in the public 
sector compared to the private sector in Germany, the general notion is that even those 
public sector employees who are not public servants are much better protected against 
lay-offs than their counterparts in the private economy (Bielenski & Ullmann, 2005; 
Jahn, 2004). During the time I conducted the interviews, the expiration of the 
bargaining clause did not seem to have any effect on the university’s personnel policy. 
Despite the constrained financial situation of the federal state (“Bundesland”) in which 
the university is located, no lay-offs occurred/were planned during the time I 
conducted the interviews (nor the year before).  
 Research site 2. At the American university, there are around 3,000 faculty 
and 11,000 staff for 20,000 undergraduate and graduate students at 14 colleges and 
schools. In contrast to the German case, the university in the U.S., with its mixture of 
private and state-funded schools, was severely hit by the financial crisis of 2009 and 
therefore underwent some major restructuring processes before and during the time of 
the interviews. In the year that preceded my data collection, the university cut around 
10 percent of its non-academic staff (around 700 positions) through lay-offs and early 
retirement incentives; more cuts were expected in the forthcoming years.25 The 
academic unit at which all my interviewees worked has around 300 employees, 100 of 
whom are faculty. Over the course of four years, 45 employees (around 15% of the of 
the unit’s support staff) had to leave the organization due to economic and structural 
changes.  
                                                
25 Information retrieved from the university’s independent student newspaper (date: 2/14/2011). 
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As part of its outreach program, the unit has several regional offices. By 
conducting my interviews at two different branches of the academic unit, I was able to 
take advantage of the different labor market conditions at the two campuses – as one 
was situated in the metropolitan area and the other in a rural area – as well as the 
varying degrees to which the various departments were affected by the restructuring 
processes. 
With the exception of the unionized staff, all individuals I interviewed at the 
American university were employed “at-will”, meaning they could be laid off “for 
good cause or for no cause, or even for bad cause” (Payne v. Western & Atlantic 
Railroad, Tennessee 1884). According to information from departmental directors and 
an HR representative, however, progressive discipline is applied and a 30-day notice is 
usually given in case of discharge.26  
Overall, it becomes clear from these descriptions that the two research sites 
differ considerably. They are embedded in different national labor market systems 
with distinct policies, which differ in the stringency of dismissal protection, the 
generosity of unemployment benefits, and the ease with which workers can form 
unions. The economic and structural situation, moreover, also varied considerably 
between the two research sites at the time of the interviews27. 
Interview protocol. On average, the interviews lasted one hour and seven 
minutes (the longest was five hours and 20 minutes and the shortest was 18 minutes). 
                                                
26 This information was retrieved from the university’s website (date: 2/14/2011) and background 
conversations with university representatives. 
27 Average unemployment rate at the time of the interviews as 7.2 percent in Germany between January 
and April, 2010 and 9.6 percent in the U.S. between May and August, 2010. These are harmonised data 
provided by the OECD. 
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All of the interviews were audio taped and transcribed (Ragin, 1994; Ragin, Joane, & 
White, 2004). My interview schedule was divided into two sections. The first part of 
the interview was conducted in a very exploratory manner, asking open-ended 
questions regarding the respondents’ working biographies and work-related anxieties 
and uncertainties. I also asked the respondents about their direct and indirect 
experiences with unemployment as well as knowledge and perceptions of relevant 
labor market institutions and investigated the consequences and implications of 
lacking job security, especially their loyalty vis-à-vis their respective organization, 
their willingness to invest in organization-specific skills, and their participation in 
different types of training.28 In the second part of the interview, demographic 
information that had not already been mentioned was collected, when appropriate. The 
interview schedule is provided in the Appendix. The initial interview schedule was 
continually revised and refined during the interview process, allowing me to 
incorporate new themes into the conversations with the interviewees.  
In the analysis, which took place after the completion of the data collection, I 
looked for recurring patterns and themes in the data and systematically coded the 
content of the interviews. Some of the categories emerged from the data, whereas 
others were derived from theoretical bases and the findings of my quantitative 
analyses. Based on these heuristic codes, I reorganized and re-analyzed the data, 
refining my coding scheme in the process (Ragin, 1994; Ragin et al., 2004; Weiss, 
1995). The results of these analyses are presented in the following sections. 
                                                
28 According to the “Varieties of Capitalism” argument, the acquisition of firm-specific skills should be 
closely linked to stringency of dismissal protection and generosity of unemployment benefits. However, 
no clear pattern emerged in the answers to this question. 
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Results  
Perceived job security and the negative consequences of lacking job security 
By talking about their expectations and worries regarding the permanency of 
their jobs and labor market prospects, all respondents in my interviews implicitly 
distinguished between the three analytical dimensions of perceived job security used 
in the quantitative analyses, i.e., cognitive job security, describing the expectation of 
keeping one’s job, affective job security, describing the absence of worries about 
losing one’s job, and perceived employment prospects, describing the expectation of 
finding a new job of comparable quality (Anderson et al., 2007; Borg et al., 1992). In 
addition to confirming the distinctiveness of these three aspects of perceived job 
security, the interview data illustrate further aspects of the three facets that were not 
captured by the ISSP data.  
Cognitive job security. While the survey question on cognitive job security 
(“My job is secure,” with five possible answer categories, 5 meaning “strongly agree” 
and 1 meaning “do not agree at all”) does not allow for differentiation between the 
various aspects of a job that one can potentially lose, the in-depth interviews made it 
clear that cognitive job security refers not only to the permanence of the entire job but 
also the permanence of particular aspects of it, such as the structure of the job, work 
autonomy, responsibilities, and task variety (e.g., Ashford et al., 1989). The 
importance of the versatility of a job and its variety of tasks, for example, is illustrated 
by the following statement from a senior executive at the German research site: 
“Responsibility, creativity, autonomy, freedom – I am managing a program. That’s 
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what I like about my job. This is how it should be. Of course, it has its benefits to 
come in at eight and go home at 17:30, but that’s not what I love about my work” 
(AD/D, male, Germany). An administrative assistant at the American site made a 
similar statement: “So it’s just very monotonous, you know, go into the computer and 
do this, do that. I would not want to do that. I would not want to sit there at the 
computer doing that all day. I like to have interaction with the employees and answer 
questions, etc. etc.” (AA, female, U.S.).  
The possible loss of such important aspects of work worried employees and 
resulted in major dissatisfaction and loss of motivation, as illustrated by the following 
statement from an employee whose program underwent major restructuring: "When I 
started working in academia, I wanted to teach.  This particular job seems to have 
evolved into something more like selling real estate or making widgets.  We're 
expected to generate our own funding by selling our educational services.  I didn't start 
out wanting to have a job that was chasing funding, but I feel like I've been doing it... 
It makes me question whether I really want to do this job anymore. ... It's a very 
different situation now" (AD/D, female, U.S.). Other important aspects of work that 
respondents were worried about losing in the course of organizational restructuring 
were their working hours and flexibility. “I am afraid that they will be cutting my 
hours even more.” (AA, female, U.S.). “So, it’s just a lot of flexibility. … I think I am 
more afraid of going somewhere else and having to fight for all that again” (AA, 
female, Germany). 
What makes the experience of lacking job security particularly unbearable for 
most employees is the feeling of powerlessness and uncertainty, i.e., lacking the 
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ability to change the current situation and lacking the knowledge of what will happen 
next. The discomfort with such a situation came up as a recurring theme in the 
interview data and has also been shown in previous research (Greenhalgh et al., 1984 
in particular). Individual reactions to such uncertainty and feelings of powerlessness, 
however, varied strongly among the respondents. Some approached the challenge of 
uncertainty and powerlessness in a very rational way, as illustrated by the comments 
from a female researcher:  
I think one question is sort of what I can do and what I feel is out of my control.  Big law firms 
or consulting firms are a good example. They hire thousands of people and only a few of them 
get promoted and eventually the rest of them go.  And it’s like, then, you’re in control to do a 
really good job. However,  it’s not in your control if you did really well but too many people 
were better than you. … It’s the same now with all that economic uncertainty. If you work in a 
factory, you could do a fantastic job but if they don’t get any orders, that’s not in your control. 
… So I think that’s what it is in part for me. It’s really not all in your control and you just have 
to deal with it” (RA/L/UF, female, U.S.).   
 
For others, being powerless did not only refer to their economic and personal 
situations but involved structural problems. For them, the experience of feeling 
powerless was something quite hard to deal with: “You have to fight with one hand 
tied behind your back or both hands tied behind your back if you’re insecure.  You 
can’t go to the people who are generating that insecurity and confront them or have a 
principal conversation with them because they lie to you. There is nothing you can do 
and that’s what makes it so hard“ (RA/L/UF, male, U.S.).   
Feeling in control of one’s job situation despite great uncertainty seems to help 
employees cope with uncertainties – or at least for the highly educated, as the 
following statement illustrates: “One of the reasons why I like to write grants and to 
have a hand in what I receive is that I have control. I can't blame anybody else for 
having written it badly.  The other sense of control that finding grants gives me is that 
 81 
I'm essentially funding myself a partial job every year.  I do that on a recurring basis 
and that helps a lot“ (RA/L/UF, male, U.S.). 
Perceived employment prospects. Although the lack of cognitive job security 
can also go hand in hand with a negative assessment of one’s labor market prospects 
(particularly in difficult economic times, as was the case when the interviews were 
conducted in 2010)29, all the respondents distinguished the belief that their jobs were 
secure (cognitive job security) from the assessment of the possibility of finding  new 
jobs (perceived employment prospects).  
In the German context, none of the permanent employees expected to lose their 
jobs, yet almost all were pessimistic about finding any type of new job (of comparable 
or even inferior quality) if they had to leave the organization. This statement from one 
long-term employee at the German university illustrates this lack of linkage between 
cognitive and affective job security: “I pretty sure that I can stay here until I retire, if I 
want to. I feel this is a pretty luxurious situation. … Some of my friends at my age, 
they have great difficulties finding a job and have been unemployed for a long time. It 
would be the same for me, I am pretty sure. Especially given that I have never applied 
to a job elsewhere. Where should I actually go to apply? In the private sector? I think, 
there, the general notion is that we are lazy and that our skills are outdated. Given that 
we still work with old computer programs, I actually have to admit that they are not 
entirely wrong” (AA, female, Germany).  
In the American context, in contrast, employees did not have firm beliefs about 
the continuity of their jobs. To them, the lack of “real” job security seems to be an 
                                                
29 Pearson’s correlation coefficient for the correlation between cognitive job security and perceived 
employment prospects using the 2005 ISSP data is 0.102 for Germany and 0.030 for the U.S.  
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everyday problem. As an employee from the campus in the metropolitan area put it, 
“there are always insecurities and there will always be lay-offs.  So you have to show 
your skills. I always was concerned about my job security, but since I work pretty hard 
to stay here, I try to always advance. But, yeah, there are always insecurities in every 
job” (C/FM/T, male, U.S.). An employee working on the campus in the rural area 
drew a similar conclusion: “You know, nobody is safe. You’re just not. Nobody’s job 
is secure. Not even the jobs of those who work in a prison, although they’re always 
gonna have criminals”(AA, female, U.S.).  
For employees in the U.S., however, the lack of confidence of keeping a job is 
partly offset by the expectations of being able to find a new one, at least one with 
lower pay or less attractive working conditions. Employees of all organizational ranks 
at the two research sites in the U.S. seemed not to shy away from jobs below their 
abilities and previous experience, as the following citations illustrate:  
Given that I have a college degree, I have a lot more options. Even if the economy is bad I can 
get a job – even if it was a job that I didn’t really want.  I can actually walk into a restaurant 
and get a job as a waitress, which I did many, many times (AD/D, female, US).  
 
What it truly boils down to is, “Can I replace the paycheck?” McDonald’s is paying the same 
as the university is paying me, so am I really that worried about losing my job?  Wal-Mart is 
closer, McDonald’s closer, Burger King is closer, Kmart is closer.  So am I really that worried 
about a title if I’m replacing the paycheck, dollar for a dollar, do I really have to worry about 
the title?  No, I don’t (C/FM/T, male, US).  
 
 
This tendency was less pronounced in Germany. Not only were most 
employees from the German university less confident about finding new jobs, they 
were also less willing to work in jobs below their qualifications than were their 
American colleagues.  
With all the education I have and the long time I invested to get where I actually am, I am not 
yet willing to give up on the dream of becoming a professor one day – even though it’s really 
hard these days  (RA/L/UF, male, Germany). 
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Affective job security. When they did not believe that they would be able to 
quickly find a new job of comparable quality, respondents in both countries expressed 
worries and anxieties about the prospect of job loss, which corresponds to the third 
dimension of job security, affective job security. Some feared not being able to pay the 
bills. “You know, now my check pays the mortgage and the car payment and my 
husband’s check pays everything else and if I don’t have my check, you know, 
something is not gonna get paid” (AA, female, U.S.). Others were afraid to lose an 
important source of meaning in their lives: “I don’t know if I could afford to retire. 
Aside from that, how could I not lose my identity if I no longer work?” (AD/D, male, 
U.S.).  
Consequences of lacking job security. Respondents who felt that the 
continuity of their jobs was threatened and worried about being unemployed reported 
all of the negative consequences of lacking job security that have been found in 
previous studies (e.g., Ashford et al., 1989; 1999; De Witte, 2005; Ferrie, 2001; Green 
et al., 2000; Smithson et al., 2000; Sverke et al., 2002), including problems of physical 
and mental health:  “I got depressed.  I got really depressed.  I got very negative.  I got 
physically sick several times but I’ve never been sick like that before. … You know, it 
got worse and worse, and it caused me to be more and more sick in my heart and in 
my body at times, etc” (AD/D, male, U.S.). The feeling of powerlessness also made 
them more likely to accept anything they were asked to do and to stop looking after 
themselves. According to one respondent: “I think I'm more likely to say yes to 
everything.  I am not choosy any more; just ask “What do you need? I'll be there". I do 
feel much less able to say no” (AD/D, female, U.S.).  
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The negative consequences of employees’ lack of job security for 
organizations were also reflected in the interviews. Interviewees who felt that their job 
security was threatened tended to identify less with the organization and exhibited 
lower organizational commitment: “And I've narrowed my scope of work as well.  So 
I no longer do the work of my program. I just focus on my team.   I have to say, I’ve 
become more self-interested, whereas I used to think a lot more broadly about what 
were the good connections for the school. ... And that's is a little bit of disengagement 
on my part, you know”  (AD/D, female, U.S.).  
In addition, the concern about losing their jobs also reduced workers’ 
willingness to speak up, express their concerns, and exhibit organizational citizenship 
behavior: “When everybody is running scared to work, then everybody is protecting 
their own little thing. These little networks of support that you have just disintegrate. 
Because, you know, you would ordinarily have this group cohesion where you have a 
bunch of people supporting each other but nobody is willing to support anybody else 
in case it pointed at them, right?  … Everybody, I think, is really, really afraid of 
speaking up, to stick out.  Yeah, I am afraid, too” (AA, female, U.S.). Engagement and 
support for others and extra-role behaviors, however are a crucial element of 
organizational success (Feather et al., 2004; Reisel, Probst, Chia, Maloles, & König, 
2010). A recent study by Detert and Edmondson (forthcoming), moreover, shows that 
such self-censorship, which has detrimental effects on the functioning of 
organizations, is very common.30 
                                                
30 A somewhat contradictory and, most likely, idiosyncratic finding is that interviewees also said that 
the joint experience of worrying about their jobs brought them closer together with their colleagues. 
One could easily imagine that employees would start to become more competitive and mistrustful and 
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Increased turnover intention, a consequence of lacking job security well-
established in the literature (Barling et al., 1996; Chirumbolo et al., 2003; Pfeffer, 
1998; Sverke et al., 2001; Sverke et al., 2002), was another negative consequence that 
came up as a recurring theme in the interviews. Several of the employees who did not 
feel confident about the continuity of their jobs mentioned that they were looking for 
other jobs: “So I deal with it by trying to do my job as best I can while always looking 
for something else. It’s just a very difficult place to stay” (AA, female, U.S.).  
In sum, the interviews showed that the three analytical dimensions of perceived 
job security – cognitive job security, perceived labor market prospects, and affective 
job security – indeed capture different elements of the concept and that the 
respondents in both countries distinguish between these aspects in their descriptions of 
their current job situations, work-related anxieties, and expectations. The negative 
consequences of lacking job security, found in previous works using surveys (see 
Sverke's and Näswall's (2002) metanalysis for an overview), also emerged as themes 
in the interviews.  
In the following sections, I use the interview data to interpret the findings of 
my quantitative analysis. First, I elucidate the mechanisms that underlie the 
relationship between individual-level characteristics and perceived job security and 
then elaborate on the relationship between macro-level labor market institutions and 
individual-level perceptions of job security. The third part of my qualitative analyses 
                                                                                                                                       
eventually turn against each other in such circumstances, but this is not what I observed in my case 
studies, as the following quote illustrates: “You know, all the staff kind of talk. We’re all in the same 
boat and none of us feels safe. But it brings us together as staff because we have something in common. 
You know, it separates us from the higher-ups” (AA, female, U.S.).  
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is concerned with the strategies that individuals employ to construct feelings of job 
security. 
 
Individual and organizational-level reasons for perceived job security 
The individual-level characteristics that have been found to influence feelings 
of job security in my quantitative analyses31 and in previous studies (Sverke et al., 
2002 for an overview) also came up in the respondents’ descriptions and explanations 
of whether and why they feel secure about their jobs. In addition, several individual-
level characteristics that were not modeled in the quantitative analyses due to a lack of 
data emerged as themes in the interviews, as did several interesting interaction effects 
between individual-level characteristics that were shown neither in the quantitative 
analyses of this dissertation nor in other research. 
As expected, gender and marital status came up as themes and topics in the 
interviews. In addition, interviewees’ descriptions and explanations revealed that the 
relationship between these variables and perceived job security is contingent on the 
respondent’s personal background and family situation (e.g., see Tolbert & Moen, 
1998 on gender differences on definitions of good jobs)32. Interestingly, the effects of 
having a spouse/partner differed for men and women. Women, even those with higher 
                                                
31 These are gender, age, marital status, presence of children in the household, education, occupation, 
union membership, and several workplace characteristics such as the relationship with supervisors and 
colleagues. 
3232 As a reminder, my quantitative analyses indicate no statistically significant differences between 
men and women with regard to cognitive job security. With regard to perceived employment prospects 
and affective job security, the analyses show that women on average tend to be less optimistic about 
quickly finding a new job of comparable quality and more worried about the prospect of losing their 
jobs than men (p < 0.05). While singles tend to be less optimistic about keeping their jobs (p < 0.001) 
and more worried about losing their jobs (p < 0.001) than married individuals or individuals in a steady 
relationship, they exhibit greater perceived employment prospects (p < 0.001).  
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positions and education, tended to point out that having a partner – or family support, 
in general – helped them to be less worried about job loss and even made them think 
less about the prospect of losing their jobs: “And then I got married which really 
helped. I am not as worried anymore as I used to be ‘coz now there’s two of us” (AA, 
female, Germany; similar statements were also made by women on the U.S. research 
sites). For men, however, the situation seemed to be slightly different, especially if 
they had children: “Like I said, now I have a family. I have two kids at home.  I have a 
mortgage.  I need the health insurance. When I was young I did not care. All I had 
back then was a car payment. So I’m not risk averse but right now I have stuff that 
needs to be protected” (AD/D, male, U.S.). Having a partner seemed to reduce the 
perceived responsibility to contribute to the household income for women, whereas it 
increased the subjective burden for men. The traditional roles of the male breadwinner 
and the female housekeeper thus seem to influence the subjective dimension of work 
and employment. 
Age also came up as an important factor affecting feelings of job security. The 
greater responsibility that older individuals tend to have for others, or the increased 
pressure to ensure material well-being after retirement, might explain why age is such 
an important predictor of perceived job security. Several respondents explicitly 
mentioned this link: “But I worry about it more now because I am older. And I have 
children. You know, I have a family that I have to take care of and back then it was 
just me” (AA, female, U.S.; similar statements were also made by respondents in 
Germany).   
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The negative association between age and perceived job security can be 
attributed to the lack of confidence of easily finding a new job of comparable quality.  
According to one respondent: “I mean 10 years ago, if I had lost my job, I would have 
been like, “Alright, well that's bad.  I'll start my own firm,” or “I'll find another 
job.”… No, I wasn't really prepared for this old age” (AD/D, female, U.S.). This fear 
of being unable to find a new job seems to be particularly widespread among older 
workers in Germany, whose objective chances of finding new jobs if laid off, as 
measured by local unemployment rates at the time I conducted my interviews, were 
actually much better than those of the interviewees in the U.S.33 According to one 
German respondent: “I discovered during my year of unemployment that with 40, 
you’re considered an older worker and I won’t see 40 again. It’s a horrifying prospect 
that I might never find another job in case I lose this one“ (AA, female, Germany). 
Although older workers were not confident about quickly finding new jobs of 
comparable quality, those who had stayed with their organizations for a long time, i.e., 
had long tenure (which was the case with most interviewees at the German research 
site but also for many at the U.S. sites) tended to be very confident about the 
continuity of their jobs: “I’ve been here long enough. I’ve seen how it grew and how it 
went down. After everything we went through after reunification, I don’t think that the 
changes that may happen in the future will harm me“ (AD/D, male, Germany).  
 By comparing their current situation to earlier times, for example when they 
were younger or not yet married, respondents were implicitly alluding to the fact that 
their relative situation was at least as important for feelings of job security as their 
                                                
33 The average unemployment rate in Germany between January and April, 2010 was 7.2 percent and 
9.6 percent in the U.S. between May and August, 2010 (data  provided by the OECD and harmonised). 
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objective one. The importance of comparisons became even more explicit when they 
talked about their skills and qualifications. One interviewee directly stated that “being 
a step ahead” with his professional abilities was what ensured his job security: “I mean 
my job security depends on my skills, for instance. To have some comparative 
advantage is what counts” (RA/L/UF, male, U.S.). Likewise, comparing one’s own 
education to those of others can also decrease perceived job security when others have 
“more to offer,” as the following exemplifies: “I do not have a college degree; 
everybody who was in my position does, so that puts me at a disadvantage” (AA, 
female, U.S.). Thus, rather than the absolute level of education, formal degrees, and 
skills, it is the comparison with others of similar organizational rank or in similar 
positions that seems to impact feelings of job security. 
The positive association between union membership and perceived job security 
that I found in both my quantitative and qualitative analyses can be explained in a 
similar manner – at least for unionized workers in the U.S. The unionized workers I 
interviewed in the U.S. all felt more confident about keeping their jobs than their non-
unionized counterparts: “Being a union worker gives me a little more job security, I 
guess. I am definitely more secure than the non-unionized workers here” (C/FM/T, 
male, U.S.).  
In addition to this relative betterment, other factors seem to matter for the 
positive association between union membership and perceived job security. In the U.S. 
for example, senior union members who are in danger of being laid-off can replace 
junior members if they are qualified for the position (“bumping right”), which also 
contributes to their perceived job security. Moreover, unionized workers in both 
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countries mentioned that the university management has to deal with the union 
representatives and not only the single members when planning to terminate 
employees, which also helps them to feel more secure about their jobs.  
Having such support turned out to be an important element in employees’ 
perceptions of job security. The feeling of being supported or having someone fighting 
for their position helped my respondents to be confident of keeping their jobs: “I feel 
much, much more secure and more supported because the faculty support my position. 
… Those are the guys I have to keep happy and then they’ll keep the dean happy” 
(AA, female, U.S.). 
Another observation that applies to workers in both countries is that temporary 
employees, who by definition do not have the prospect of an open-ended career within 
a particular organization, do not seem to be confident about the continuity of their 
jobs. In accordance with previous research (De Witte, 1999; De Witte et al., 2003; 
Pearce, 1998), temporary workers in both countries had low cognitive job security and  
found this to be a highly unpleasant situation, as illustrated by the following:  
But, yeah, temping is just an anxiety-producing situation. (AA, female, Germany). 
  
It’s not good being a temp, especially, in the economic climate today, it’s… just no jobs and 
always the risk that my contract will not be renewed. You know, at one point that was fun 
because we weren’t tied down to anything. Loose and fancy for the instincts the expression 
goes, but now there are just so few jobs. (AA, female, U.S.).  
 
 
Here again, the severity of the burden seems to be contingent on other 
circumstances. Older employees seemed to be more concerned when working on a 
temporary contract than younger ones, as were those who had been employed as  
temporary workers several times in a row: “So I guess I’ve had four terms then... yeah, 
as I said I can’t believe how long I’ve been here.  But each time, I get very depressed 
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and I just think that, you know, if I can’t have a job, I can’t live, literally, because 
there’s nobody who’s going to help me.” (AA, female, no information on research site 
to ensure confidentiality).  In contrast, those who worked in jobs that are characterized 
by great discontinuity, e.g., lecturers and research associates in Germany, did not seem 
to be negatively affected by working on temporary contracts: “Working on a 
temporary contract is normal. That’s just what it is. You’ll find no university, nowhere 
in Germany, where people in my age or position work on a permanent contract or are 
public servants. It’s normal to me. I don’t care. Some day this will change, when I am 
a professor, I guess – which I hopefully will be at some point” (RA/L/UF, male, 
Germany).  
Previous experiences with unemployment and job searches also seemed to 
influence employees’ feelings of job security in both countries. Positive experiences 
with job searches in the past increased individuals’ perceived employment prospects 
and affective job security. That is, those who had always found a job in the past when 
looking for one were not worried about their future, even though they were not sure 
whether they would actually stay with the organization. This attitude was particularly 
widespread at the two research sites in the U.S., where respondents were not only 
confronted with a greater chance of losing their jobs, but also had objectively lower 
chances of quickly finding  new ones than the respondents at the German research site, 
given the inferior labor market conditions. According to one American respondent: 
“Well, you know, I’ve never been unemployed but I’ve always been willing to work 
as a temp and when I first got here, I actually started working as a temp secretary.  
You know, there’s always the need for temps” (AA, female, U.S.). In Germany, 
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respondents were much more pessimistic about their chances of finding  new jobs, 
especially when they had previously had trouble finding a job or knew someone for 
whom it had been difficult: “It was so hard to eventually get in here, to be hired as a 
permanent employee (“Planstelle”). I do not want to imagine what it would be like to 
go through the entire process again. … One of my neighbors …, she also has big 
trouble finding something. She had been staying home with the kids for some time and 
now, and she won’t get in any more” (AA, female, Germany). Personal experience and 
observations may thus exert a much more powerful influence on individuals’ 
perceptions than do labor market policies (known as the availability bias, see 
Kahneman and Tversky 1974; 1981).  
The idea of involuntary job loss, however, never seems to be free from worry 
and concern, either for employees in Germany nor in the U.S.: “I always knew I’d find 
something but I always had that nagging in the background. You know, I’m a single 
mom, what if I get hurt? What if I have to go in for surgery, you know? What do you 
do then when you’re on disability and you’re only getting a partial pay check?” 
(C/FM/T, female, U.S.). Negative experiences, direct or indirect, not only leave scars 
but also unsettle employees, making them apprehensive at the prospect of dismissal 
and pessimistic about their labor market chances. Knowing that others have lost their 
jobs and have then had a hard time finding new ones (or had no problem at all) thus 
seem to impact workers’ confidence in the same way as does their own experience (De 
Witte et al., 2003).  
In sum, the interview data substantiated the findings of my quantitative 
analyses on the individual-level causes of job security and revealed the importance of 
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several more individual characteristics that could not be modeled with the ISSP data, 
such as the terms of the employment contract (temporary vs. permanent position), 
organizational tenure, and previous experience with unemployment. In addition to 
substantiating the findings of my first study, the qualitative data also shed some light 
on interesting interaction effects between several individual-level characteristics (e.g., 
gender and marital status) and reveals the mechanisms and processes by which 
individual-level characteristics generate feelings of job security. The main findings of 
this first section are that a) one’s own situation in comparison to others influences 
perceptions of job security more than one’s objective situation, b) the degree of 
dependence employees feel with regard to a particular job is an important determinant 
for perceived job security, and c) personal experiences and observations from their 
immediate environment are central to workers’ feelings of job security and their 
expectations about future employment prospects.  
 
The role of institutions in generating feelings of job security 
 An important motivation for conducting the in-depth interviews with 
employees of varying organizational ranks and educational backgrounds in Germany 
and the U.S. was to obtain a better understanding of the results of my quantitative 
analyses. According to the logic underlying the argument of institutional 
complementarities (Hall et al., 2001b), higher levels of dismissal protection should be 
associated with greater cognitive job security, and more generous unemployment 
benefits should be associated with greater perceived employment prospects and higher 
affective job security. However, my quantitative analyses, based on survey data from 
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the ISSP and data on labor market institutions from the OECD, did not confirm all of 
these relationships.  
 As a reminder, the relationship between unemployment benefits and affective 
job security was positive and statistically significant; the relationship between 
unemployment benefits and perceived employment prospects was also positive but 
statistically not significant; the relationship between dismissal protection and cognitive 
job security was negative but not statistically significant unless the analyses accounted 
for the proportion of temporary workers in the workforce. Likewise, the relationship 
between the proportion of temporary workers and cognitive job security by itself was 
also negative and statistically not significant. Only in the presence of a large 
proportion of temporary workers, i.e., employees with much lower levels of protection 
than those of permanent employees, does dismissal protection seem to lend its 
protective psychological effect.  
 Previous studies on the relationship between labor market institutions and 
perceptions of job security based on data from European labor markets also found that 
workers in countries with high dismissal protection tend to feel less secure than those 
in countries with little legal protection, though they did not examine the contingency 
of the effect of dismissal protection on the presence of temporary workers. (Clark et 
al., 2009; Postel-Vinay et al., 2004; Sousa-Poza, 2004). These studies, however, were 
not able to provide an explanation for this disconnect. With the analysis of my 
qualitative data, I seek to fill this gap. 
Limited knowledge about policies reducing power differentials. One goal of 
conducting interviews with employees was to learn how much respondents knew 
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about labor market institutions. If employees lack sufficient knowledge about the 
institutions that underlie their employment contracts, it is not be surprising when 
policies fail to produce the expected effects. The suspicion that employees do indeed 
have insufficient knowledge about the laws and regulations underlying their 
employment contracts is supported by a study from Roehling and Boswell (2004), who 
showed that employees in the U.S. working on at-will contracts still believed that their 
employer would need to have a good reason to lay them off. In another study based on 
longitudinal data from Germany, Giesecke (2009) found that workers on non-standard 
employment contracts underestimated the risks of career interruptions.  
In accordance with these studies, I also found that employees did not have a 
good grasp of the rights they are granted through employment regulations and the 
benefits they can receive in case of job loss. This lack of knowledge was particularly 
pronounced when respondents were asked about the procedures accompanying lay-offs 
and terminations. Employees at the American research site, who according to state law 
are all “at-will employees”, tended to overestimate their protections. They believed that 
the university would need to have a reason to lay them off: “I think legally, they have to 
give you a reason why, but then I hope I’m never in that situation” (AA, female, U.S.); 
or they expected to receive a notification if the university decided to terminate them for 
economic reasons: “So, if was going to be fired, I would know…. But that again is not 
at-will. It’s something that we would be notified of. So they just can’t come in one day 
and say, here you go, pack your things“ (AD/D, female, U.S.). Others simply were not 
sure of the type of contract on which they were working: “I’m not sure. I don’t know if 
I am at-will or not. In a lot of my previous jobs, I’ve had to sign an agreement saying, 
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as an at-will employee, I can be terminated at any point for any reason. And I am also 
free to leave at any point for any reason. I don’t remember signing that here” (AA, 
female, U.S.). 
The fact that most respondents in the U.S., regardless of their occupational rank 
and educational background, tended to overrate their levels of protection may be due to 
the university’s practice of providing employees with several warnings and a formal 
procedure before termination. Moreover, such lack of knowledge is actually not 
surprising given that lay-offs and terminations can involve very individualized or 
organization-specific procedures (OECD, 2004: 65), which makes it difficult for 
individuals to assess their actual level of protection.  
However, since employees in Germany did not have a good grasp of lay-off 
processes and the reasons for which they could be terminated either, it is actually fair to 
draw the general conclusion that knowledge about dismissal protection is generally 
fairly limited. It seems that workers with high levels of protection underestimate their 
security, while those with low levels of protection overestimate it. The beliefs about the 
contract and expectations about what is just and right in the context of an employment 
relationship may therefore not differ as much across countries as the actual legal 
provisions and seem to be more important than what is written in the books. 
It must be noted, however, that not all employees were unaware of their levels 
of protections. In addition to those with a background in law or HR, those who felt that 
their or their colleagues’ jobs were threatened were also more knowledgeable about 
their rights and protections (or the lack thereof). An employee who felt that his current 
position was endangered reported that he “actually just found out last week that it is 
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only at-will here” (C/FM/T, male, U.S.). Likewise, those who knew people who were 
laid off or unemployed were also more knowledgeable about the existence and the 
content of labor market and organizational policies. One German employee even 
directly attributed his knowledge about dismissal protection and unemployment 
benefits to the unemployment experience of a close family member: “Well, I probably 
wouldn’t know if I hadn’t had people around me [who were dismissed]” (AD/D, male, 
Germany).  
The psychologically protective effects of dismissal protection thus seem to be 
limited because employees have insufficient knowledge about their rights. Together 
with organizational practices and norms, previous experience with the organization’s 
handling of lay-offs and implicit expectations vis-à-vis the employer (“psychological 
contract”) seem to be more important for feelings of job security than formal policies. 
However, when workers feel that their job security is threatened, dismissal protection 
can still decrease their feelings of powerlessness, because the threat causes them to seek 
to learn more about their rights vis-à-vis their employers.   
Limited trust in policies reducing power differentials. Even those who were 
not at-will employees and knew about their rights in case of dismissals did not convey 
an optimistic view regarding the effectiveness of their legal protections. Neither the 
employees in Germany, who had not recently experienced lay-offs at the university, 
nor the unionized workers in the U.S., who also had relatively high protections against 
lay-offs but had been confronted with major lay-offs in the last four years, seemed to 
trust the protections that they were granted by law or by the union contract. The 
following statement from a unionized employee in the U.S. exemplifies such general 
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mistrust: “And they kind of targeted her [a colleague] and found just a bogus reason to 
fire her. It was something that all of us have done before.  They accused her of stealing 
the company’s time and money. It was ridiculous. She had used the phone.  It was 
nothing any of us haven’t done but it was a reason that they could give and justify for 
her to be laid off” (C/FM/T, female, U.S.). Employees in Germany expressed similar 
reservations. Even those who were dissatisfied that poorly performing colleagues had 
not been terminated in the past did not attribute their actual job security to the legal 
provisions but rather to organizational characteristics: “I’d say it’s more the opposite 
here. We had this one colleague. She was really very unreliable, had a lot of personal 
problems, too, but still. We had to do all her work. It took forever until she just got a 
warning. It’s because we’re in the public sector and have an involved Betriebsrat 
(works council)” (C/FM/T, female, Germany). 
Such lack of trust and confidence in the effectiveness of policies may not be 
surprising in the context of an unequal exchange relationship, in which institutions can 
seek to adjust but never eliminate power differentials. Since the employee remains 
dependent on having a job with the employer, (perceived) power differentials do not 
vanish. The following statement from an employee in the U.S. regarding the signing of 
a previous employment contract illustrates such feelings of dependence and unequal 
power: “I just remember having the experience of being in the backroom at the store at 
the mall. ’You see, you need to sign this. It just says we can fire you if we want to and 
that you can leave if you want to, even in the middle of your shift. And there will be 
no legal repercussions.’ And I said, ’Okay. I’ll sign that. I need the job’ you know” 
(AA, female, U.S.).  Likewise, the following statement from a German employee 
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regarding the effectiveness of dismissal protection also illustrates that feelings of 
dependence never completely vanish in employment relationships: “If they really want 
to lay you off, they’ll lay you off. There is always a reason. And even if there is no 
reason, would you want to work at a place where you do not feel appreciated?” 
(C/FM/T, male, Germany).   
This loss of confidence in labor market policies and institutions seeking to 
reduce power differentials between the employee and the employer may also be due to 
the general trend towards more unstable careers and employment relations (e.g., 
Atkinson, 1984; Blanchard et al., 2002; Giesecke et al., 2003; Kalleberg, 2000; 
Polavieja, 2006). Back in 1997, for example, the association between dismissal 
protection and cognitive job security was still positive, as Anderson and Pontusson 
(2007) show in a study using the 1997 wave of the ISSP data. It thus may be that 
increasing levels of job instability and career turbulences have reinforced workers’ 
feelings of powerlessness and reduced their confidence in the protective mechanisms 
of institutions. 
Protective psychological effects of policies decreasing vulnerability. A 
slightly different picture emerged when the interviewees talked about the possibility of 
becoming unemployed and the benefits they would receive in case of a job loss. 
Although most interviewees were ignorant of the exact amount and duration of 
unemployment benefits, they all knew that they were at least entitled to financial 
support, as the following statements from an employee in the U.S. and one in 
Germany indicate:  
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I think what I’d get would be something like half of what your rate is now or something like 
that.  Unfortunately, I don’t … knock on wood … but I think it’s half of your salary (C/FT/T, 
male, U.S.). 
 
I’ve never been unemployed but it is something around 65 percent of your income, for a year 
or so; they shortened it, and afterwards it is Hartz IV (AD/D, female, Germany). 
 
A comparison with the actual provisions of financial support in case of 
unemployment shows that the respondents in both countries had a good grasp of their 
potential benefits. In the U.S., the payment of unemployment benefits is regulated by 
state law. On average, states replace 50 percent of the lost wages up to a certain 
threshold, which is usually set at the state’s average weekly earnings. This is also the 
case for the state in which I conducted my interviews. Eligible claimants receive 1/26 
of their net wage in the “high quarter,” i.e., the quarter during the last four quarters in 
which they had their highest wages. The maximum amount of benefits that are paid 
are around $400/week. The usual maximum duration of 26 weeks can be extended to 
up to 67 (currently even up to 99) weeks under special circumstances.34 In Germany, 
the payment of unemployment benefits is regulated by federal law. Eligible claimants 
with children receive 67 percent of their average net income of the last 12 months; 
those without children receive 60 percent. Depending on the claimant’s age and the 
time during which he or she paid the contributions to the unemployment insurance 
system, benefits are paid for a maximum of 24 months. Before 2005, i.e., before the 
                                                
34 Source: http://www.ows.doleta.gov/unemploy/uilawcompar/2008/monetary.pdf &  
http://jobsearch.about.com/gi/o.htm?zi=1/XJ&zTi=1&sdn=jobsearch&cdn=careers&tm=28&f=00&su=
p284.9.336.ip_p554.18.336.ip_&tt=11&bt=0&bts=1&zu=http%3A//www.labor.state.ny.us/ui/claimanti
nfo/UIBenefitsCalculator.shtm 
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enactment of the “Hartz”-legislation that the interviewee referred to, unemployment 
benefits were paid for a much longer time.35 
However, the protective function of unemployment benefits also seems to be 
limited – at least for the interviewees in the U.S., who did not have a positive view of 
the usefulness of these benefits as an actual safeguard: “That’s what they give you. If 
you make like 600, they give you 300 and it’s not worth it, it really isn’t.” (C/FT/T, 
male, U.S.). Since the receipt of unemployment benefits is also socially stigmatized, 
workers in the U.S. do not necessarily consider utilizing unemployment benefits, even 
if they are entitled to apply: “Yeah. I never was ever unemployed. I always did 
something. … You know, but I would take jobs under the table and stuff, I didn’t - I 
don’t wanna take unemployment” (C/FT/T, female, U.S.). 
Thanks to the higher levels of financial support in case of unemployment, 
workers in Germany felt much more reassured by the prospect of receiving 
unemployment benefits in case of job loss than workers in the U.S.: “It’s a little bit 
terrifying but… no, I mean, it really helps to know that I’m financially okay for at 
least a while” (AA, female, Germany). In the U.S., only unemployment benefits in 
combination with personal savings helped workers to reduce their worries associated 
with job loss: “I've also been able to save up some money; I can pull it off anytime, I 
can find some way to get by” (AD/D, male, U.S.). 
Protective psychological effects of policies reducing relative risks and relative 
vulnerability. In addition to reducing power differentials between the employee and 
the employer and reducing the employees’ vulnerability in case of job loss, I also 
                                                
35 Source: http://www.bmas.de/portal/13220/arbeitslosengeld__1.html 
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suggested that increasing the employee’s relative position with respect to a 
comparison group is a third mechanism that potentially affects job security. For 
example, permanent employees’ protections against lay-offs are much better than 
those of temporary employees. Likewise, unionized workers have greater objective job 
security than their non-unionized counterparts. While the first mechanism was found 
not to be effective in either my quantitative or my qualitative analyses, the second and 
the third mechanisms do seem to achieve their objectives.  
The comparison with a reference group that does considerably better or worse 
has been shown to affect individuals’ assessment of and satisfaction with their own 
situation (e.g. Stouffer 1949; Crosby 1982) and seems to also be at work in the context 
of the employment relationship. Relative betterment apparently increases the 
confidence of those with higher levels of protection, such as permanent employees 
compared to temporary employees: “If someone had to go in our department, for some 
restructuring or something, they would first let the temps go or just not renew them” 
(AD/D, female, Germany). Union members – at least those in the U.S. – likewise 
stated that they had reason to be more confident about keeping their jobs than non-
union members: “I am definitely more secure than the non-unionized workers here” 
(C/FM/T, male, U.S.). 
In particular, the “bumping right” of unionized workers in the U.S., i.e., their 
right to replace other employees with lower seniority with similar or lower 
qualifications in case of job loss, seems to positively affect cognitive job security: “If I 
am ever gonna be laid off, I know there are other people down at the bottom that I 
could bump” (AA, female, U.S.).  The simple awareness of these rights seems to have 
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a reassuring effect, suggesting that, in principle, increasing one’s relative power vis-à-
vis the high-power exchange partner can be a successful strategy to ensure confidence 
on the side of the low-power party.  
Further organizational policies that increase employees’ dependence. In my 
qualitative analyses, I identified employer-provided benefits as a fourth type of 
institutional mechanism that apparently influences perceptions of job security, in 
particular affective job security. Employer-provided benefits, such as health insurance 
and pension plans, increase employees’ dependence on their jobs, especially older 
workers and workers with long tenure. Despite the positive impact that these policies 
may have on employees’ well-being and their organizational commitment, they also 
increase the costs for the employee to leave the organization. Individuals who work in 
organizations that provide such benefits (as the American university does) and expect 
to lose their jobs are thus much more fearful of this prospect than those in 
organizations without such benefits: “And then, you know, as of about last year, 
around my birthday, I started thinking, ‘Oh, I really can't leave’ or ‘I don't want to 
leave’ because the one benefit that I would get from retiring is that they will pay your 
state healthcare plan for the rest of your life.  And that's huge, given the situation that 
we're in.  Well, I really started to think, ’I need to figure out a way to stay here.’  
Anxiety started to come in: ‘Oh, we're dead in the water with the healthcare benefits.  
I'll lose the chance at a lifetime of healthcare benefit.’  So, economically, it started to 
look like, ’I really need to stay here.’” (A/AD, female, U.S.). Employees’ in Germany, 
in contrast, who are covered by Germany’s universal health care system and whose 
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old age pension benefits are not contingent on the university, felt less dependent on 
their jobs than their American counterparts. 
In sum, the main finding of my qualitative analyses on the role of formal 
institutions and policies for perceptions of job security is that the effectiveness of 
dismissal protection for employees’ feelings of job security is limited. The analyses of 
the qualitative interview data thus provide further evidence that institutions matter less 
than the comparative welfare state research suggests, or at least that not all types of 
institutions seem to work in a straightforward way. Either employees do not know 
what their actual protections against dismissal are or, if they do know (which is the 
case for those who expect to lose their jobs), they do not believe that institutions really 
limit the employer’s power and superiority. Second, the effectiveness of 
unemployment benefits is also contingent on employees’ knowledge about this safety 
net as well as on the generosity of the benefits. The third important finding is that the 
relative level of protection matters more than the absolute level of protection for 
employees’ perceptions of job security, as has been shown by the statements from 
permanent employees with respect to temporary employees and from union members 
in the U.S. with respect to non-union members.  
Respondents’ explanations and descriptions suggest that the effectiveness of 
formal institutions is contingent on their comprehensibility, tangibility, and generosity. 
The more concrete the mechanism is by which one is protected, the more effective 
labor market policies can be in instilling confidence and positive expectations.  
While these conclusions apply to employees in both countries, I also found 
considerable differences in German and American workers’ assessments regarding the 
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use of unemployment benefits and their perceived helpfulness in case of 
unemployment, as well as the role such of organizational policies as health care and 
employer-provided retirement benefits. Taken together, my findings suggest that the 
rationality assumption underlying the large bulk of comparative welfare state literature 
may not always hold true. To design effective policies and regulations it is therefore 
crucial to consider the mechanisms that underlie the various types of policies and the 
interactions between institutions, individual characteristics, and organizational 
policies.  
 
Constructing job security 
In addition to validating and elucidating the findings of my quantitative 
analyses, I sought to use the qualitative interviews to move away from “preconceived 
notions of what phenomena mean in a particular setting”, as demanded by Bartunek and 
Seo (2002) in their plea for a more qualitative approach to perceptions of job security. 
By analyzing the data in an exploratory manner, I find that almost all employees – even 
those who said that they were not sure whether they would keep their jobs in the near 
future – believe to have good reasons for a) why it would be unlikely that they would 
actually lose their jobs, or b) why they would not care about this loss.36 Despite the 
worse economic situation, it is only the group of the low-income and low-educated 
workers that is more likely to expect job loss and more fearful of this prospect today 
than 30 to 40 years ago.  
                                                
36 This finding of “partial ignorance” is in line with what Jacobs and Newman (2006) have shown for 
the U.S.: The feeling of job security and the actual risk of job loss do not correlate for all educational 
and occupational groups. In their descriptive analyses of the GSS they show that only low skilled 
workers exhibit signs of insecurity and fear, while the higher tiers do not. 
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The analyses of my in-depth interview data provide further evidence for this 
finding and, in addition, reveal that this finding is not unique to the U.S. My findings 
show another interesting commonality between the employees in both countries and 
illustrate the role of the normative and cognitive-cultural aspects of institutions in 
instilling confidence about workers’ future employment prospects.  
Although the way in which interviewees make sense of their situations and 
anchor their feelings of job security is contingent on individual differences and 
organizational particularities, five major coping patterns of argumentation emerged 
from the interviews. The first is the tendency to simply ignore the threat; the second is 
the inclination to rely on the implicit expectations and promises inherent in the 
employment relationship; the third is the belief and/or the attempt to ensure that one’s 
skills, knowledge, or current position are indispensable to the functioning of the 
organization; the fourth is the re- and devaluation of the current job; the fifth and last 
involves efforts and activities to avert threats to one’s job security.  
Ignoring the threat. The first coping mechanism was to simply ignore the threat 
of a potential job loss and to pretend that everything was continuing as usual, which I 
therefore term the “ostrich” or the “head-in-the-sand” technique. This behavior is also 
documented in the social psychology literature for other types of unpleasant events 
(e.g., Ditto & Lopez, 1992 for the unquestioned acceptance of favorable feedback; 
Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003 for the ignorance of negative feedback). Statements 
indicating that individuals sought to not be influenced by what was happening in their 
environment, e.g., rumors or the announcement of restructuring, were often made in 
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connection with the intention of not wanting to be worried or to simply do the best they 
could, as illustrated by the following:  
I am just trying not to think about it too much and try to do the best I can do (AA, female, 
Germany) 
 
I just live day to day.  I mean I want to see my future, a good future but I try not to think about it 
so much.  So, I do not want to lose sleep every night.  Hopefully, it’s for the best that I cannot 
dwell on it, think about it.  Things are going to happen, but now I am still here.  I will do the 
best I can (AA, female, U.S.).  
 
Relying on implicit expectations and promises. The second type of strategy 
that employees used is closely related to the literature on psychological contracts 
(Argyris, 1960; Rousseau, 1995; Rousseau & Greller, 1994; Rousseau & Schalk, 
2000; Schein, 1980; Shore & Tetrick, 1994). The expectation of reciprocity (Gouldner, 
1960), which can be based either on explicit promises by organizational agents (Shore 
et al., 1994) or on the past or present treatment of the employees (Eisenberger, Jones, 
Aselage, & Sucharski, 2004), was a recurrent theme in employees’ explanation for 
why they expected to keep their jobs, even if they were convinced that others would 
not.  
For example, those workers with long tenure expressed the expectation that 
their loyalty and long-term commitment would be rewarded with job security: “I expect 
from the university that for an employee that has been dedicated to this institution for 
27 years, they’d better find me a job elsewhere on this campus, instead of hiring 
somebody outside” (AA, female, no information on research site to ensure 
confidentiality). Likewise, the perception of being a hard worker also increased 
employees’ expectations that nothing would happen to their jobs: “But the way I see it, 
if you come in and do your job, you don’t have to worry.  If there are people who come 
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in and don’t want to do their job and want to get paid, they need to feel insecure. But 
that’s definitely not me” (C/FM/T, male, U.S.).  
Being indispensable or working in an indispensable position. A third theme 
that my respondents used to explain their confidence about keeping their jobs is their 
indispensability for their organizations. The belief that their skills and knowledge are 
crucial to the functioning of the organization provides employees not only with a 
rationale for why the organization has an interest in keeping them, but also with a sense 
of control and the feeling that they are in charge of the situation: “I feel they need me 
[chuckles].  I mean, of course they can fire me at any time but at this point, I’m not 
really overly concerned about losing my job, not as I was two years ago” (AA, female, 
no information on research site to ensure confidentiality). When the interviewee was 
asked about the reason for her confidence, she replied “Because I can … I’m the only 
one that can do it here. … Directors don’t want to do the little jobs in registration camp. 
So I’m pretty much, you know … not secure but, you know, as secure as one could be. 
I mean technically, they could really just get rid of me and force other people to do my 
job.  But I’m a helping hand.  I’ve been here for so long, I know a little bit about 
everything, so I can help everybody do their jobs” (ibid).  
Others explained that the particular position they held made it unlikely that they 
would lose their jobs: “I think in my case, our office has a lot of kind of institutional 
memory that would be gone if they fired me. … I don’t think I’m indispensable but I do 
think that I’m, I think that I’m, hhhm, I think that I would be cumbersome enough to 
replace” (AA, female, U.S.). Even those who were less optimistic about their future 
with the organization believed that it was unlikely that they would actually be 
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terminated for strategic or political reasons: “Now, I feel highly insecure.  And I think 
about it a lot.  I think about what would be the signals that say that it's actually more 
secure than I think it is?  And there are some... However, I have some reasons to think, 
well, I'm less likely to get laid off than somebody else.  Not for institutional reasons but 
purely political reasons, you know” (AD/D, female, U.S.). 
 An additional factor, which falls into the same category, is the shortage of 
personnel. For several employees, having too much work was the reason that made 
them believe that their jobs were secure: “So right now, none of us are worried about 
our jobs because we’re all doing way more work to cover for other people. We have 
more job security than ever. … Yeah, we knew we were already short. We knew if 
people left that they wouldn’t be replaced and I really got to prove my job is important 
here” (C/FM/T, female, U.S.).  
 Re-evaluating and devaluating the current job. A fourth way in which 
employees dealt with anxieties about potential job loss involved the re- and 
devaluation of the job that is potentially in jeopardy. Within this framework several 
levels of escalation can be identified. The first is the establishment of a new reference 
category. By comparing their actual levels of job security to those of employees in 
other organizations, employees provided themselves with a sense of security. For 
example, they stressed the fact that the statistical chance and actual threat of losing a 
job were lower for university employees than for employees from other organizations: 
“So it’s definitely a different atmosphere when you work in, like, a corporate setting 
versus an academic setting. … In the corporate world, it’s, like, if you’re five minutes 
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late to work, you’re panicking because you feel like you’re gonna get in trouble. This 
is not the case here” (AA, female, U.S.).  
 This sort of comparative framing, however, emerged with respect not only to 
cognitive job security but also to perceived employment prospects, as illustrated by the 
following statement from another administrative assistant, talking about a friend of 
hers: “[She works] packing pills and things like that. She doesn’t have any computer 
experience. She worked in daycare, pre-school, etc., for a while but she doesn’t have 
formal education, you know, in anything. So it’s very hard for her to find a job right 
now. So, when I compare myself to that situation, I don’t think that I have anything to 
fear” (AA, female, U.S.). 
 Closely related to these types of comparative framing is the tendency to 
increase one’s feelings of job security by telling oneself that having a job is much 
better than having no job or knowing that one will be unemployed: “I try to find 
something positive about it.  At least we have a job, you know.  I can stay here. It’s 
not like we’re put into slavery or something.  We’re still getting paid, you know.  
That’s the thing.  Be grateful that you have a job and don’t worry too much” (AA, 
female, U.S.). 
 The next escalation level is to devalue the importance and centrality of work in 
one’s life by concentrating on other important aspects, such as a hobby or family: 
“Yeah, I don’t worry too much. I am not affected personally by what is going on right 
now because I have life after. You know, I am here to do my work. … When I am 
done, I go home. I have a family, I have a little daughter, so this is my work but it is 
not really my life” (AA, female, US). Other respondents planned to do those things 
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that they always wanted to do but could not because of their jobs, which also includes 
decreased dependence on their jobs: “Well, you know, I am not from here originally. 
If they let me go, I would go back home, and even though it is rough out there, worse 
than here, but if I lose my job then I am just going to go there. This is something I 
wanted to do for a long time. It is even something I would look forward to” (AA, 
female, U.S.). 
 Closely related to this last point are the strategies that I term “devaluation 
strategies.” Employees who clearly expect to lose their jobs reduce their cognitive 
dissonance (Festinger, 1957) and make the potential discharge more bearable either by 
telling themselves that their needs and expectations do not match those of the 
organization or by stressing the fact that the organization has violated the implicit 
terms of the employment relationship: “I guess one of the sayings that kinda gets 
under my skin here quite a bit is that I hear the whole ‘Well, you should be glad you 
have a job.’  You know what, there is nothing so important about this job that I gotta 
be all that glad about it. …   So I’m not going to stand by and allow these people to 
treat me like crap because I should be happy that I have a job.  So as far as I’m 
concerned, this job is not that important.   So it truly and ultimately boils down to me 
being able to live with me – and not what they ask me to do.  And for me, as long as 
my wife and kids can still look at me in the face, understanding that I’m not doing 
what I wanna do but that I’m doing what I need to do and they still love me, I’m okay 
with that.  Ultimately, I’m okay with that.  I can live with that” (C/FM/T, male, U.S.). 
 The highest level of these escalation steps is the acceptance of a potential job 
loss and the “I do not care but just go with it” attitude which some of the respondents 
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displayed: “If people ask me, if I’m laid off, the way I see it, I have two choices:  to 
bump or accept it that maybe it’s time for me…again it’s fate.  You know, I’m not 
religious but I believe in the existence of…anyway maybe it’s fate telling me to start 
looking for a job elsewhere because I have a very long commute every day” (AA, 
female, U.S.). 
 Being proactive. The fifth and last type of coping strategy I observed in my 
interviews was the attempt to actively deal with the threat to one’s job. Here, again, 
different patterns emerged depending on a respondent’s individual situation. One 
fraction sought to re-model their jobs in such a way that they would be able to stay 
with the organizations, while the other group actively prepared for the time after a lay-
off. Those belonging to the first group tried to make themselves indispensable: “So at 
that point, I was like, hmm, I got to get myself in a place where I’m going to be 
needed. … So I strategically convinced my boss to put me into a different position – 
and it worked out. ... So, now, even if they got rid of other units, they just spent a 
million dollars on this center.  It’s not going anywhere.  They’re going to need 
somebody to run it. They’re going to need somebody to be there. And now, that’s me” 
(AA, female, no information on research site to ensure confidentiality). 
Another strategy was to increase the organization’s revenue or suggest a 
strategic departmental restructuring, both of which could ensure that the employee kept 
his or her job. The following illustrates this perceived link between revenue and 
perceptions of job security: “I have to earn money for the school by bringing in an 
acceptable class and that's it. I just think in terms of numbers and that is what secures 
my job” (AD/D, male, no information on research site to ensure confidentiality). The 
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link between a suggested restructuring and perceived job security can also be seen in 
the following: “So I tried to figure out how to put myself into a position of value in that 
map rather than trying to maintain what I’ve got and hang on to where I am. ... I 
jumped into survival mode; I offered a deal. … So this protects my position, my 
income, my benefits, protects my program, everything. It turned out to be an acceptable 
proposition”, AD/D, male, U.S.). 
The second group of the “proactives” concentrated their efforts on the time after 
a potential lay-off, which not only helps them to feel “prepared”, i.e., increase their 
perceived employment prospects, but also to reduce their level of anxieties, i.e., 
increase their affective job security. One way in which employees increased their 
perceived employment prospects was by participating in as much training as possible: 
“Yeah, while I have been working, I took many classes. It’s really cool here because 
classes are free. …  It’s also one way of preparing myself just in case they lay me off, 
but also, like, if there might be, like, openings here later on that would require those 
skills then I can move up.  But, you know, personally, it’s good to know that you are 
prepared, especially for me who has been here so long, I’m like an old block here now.  
[Laughs]  So I’ve got to be competitive enough with whatever knowledge they have 
when it comes to computers.  We shouldn’t stop going to school anyways.  We should 
always learn” (C/FM/T, male, U.S.; employees in Germany, who actually did not tend 
to expect to lose their jobs, made similar statements). 
Closely related to this general attitude that one needs to be “up-to-date” with 
one’s skills and knowledge is the tendency of those that seek to “be ready” for a 
termination either by constantly keeping an eye out for new employment opportunities 
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or by having the application materials for a new job ready: “So, that’s what’s makes me 
a little more confident now…my resume is ready [chuckles] in case, you know.  You 
never know what’s going to happen” (AA, female, U.S.). Others also had alternative 
employment opportunities: “The only reason I don’t worry is that I always have a dairy 
farm to go back to“ (AA, female, U.S.). 
In sum, one interesting and unexpected finding of my qualitative data analyses 
was that even those employees who had low levels of perceived job security still 
stressed the fact that they believed it was unlikely that they would actually be 
terminated. Although the tendency to rationalize unpleasant events and resolve 
cognitive dissonances by changing attitudes has been well-documented in the social 
psychology literature (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ditto et al., 1992; Festinger, 1957; 
Gilovich et al., 2002; Hewstone, 1989; Pandelaere & Dewitte, 2006; Tversky et al., 
1974), the insight that workers tend to build and re-build their confidence about 
keeping their jobs and staying with their organizations is still of great theoretical and 
practical importance.  
The theoretical implication is that individuals tend to choose different anchors 
and factors to construct the security they need to ensure (at least some level of) 
psychological well-being, i.e., they develop their own meanings of a situation 
depending on the situation and the context (Bartunek et al., 2002). The practical 
implication is that organizations can seek to help their employees feel secure about their 
jobs by respecting and preserving the various factors and cues that employees use to 
construct a sense of security even in a constantly changing and often uncertain working 
environment. 
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I attribute this tendency to construct job security based on personal and  job 
characteristics to the human need for security. Having a reason to believe why others 
may lose their jobs but not oneself helps employees to “function” and to go on with 
their daily lives. Those who have already given up the hope that they will stay with the 
organization pursue the strategy of devaluing their jobs and preparing for new tasks 
outside their current situation. Again, this strategy is helpful to ensure psychological 
well-being and the maintenance of a positive self-image.  
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The aim of this study was to examine the relationship between formal 
institutions and individual perceptions. To this end, I conducted two separate studies 
and analyzed the association between national-level labor market policies and 
individual-level perceptions of job security. The first study involved the analysis of 
large-scale survey data from the 2005 wave of the International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP), which I combined with country-level information on economic, 
institutional, and cultural characteristics. The second study was based on the 
qualitative analysis of in-depth interview data that I collected on employees from a 
university in Germany and one in the U.S. This combination of different types of data 
and data sources allowed me to combine a broad examination of the association 
between macro-level policies and micro-level perceptions of job security across 
varying contexts with an in-depth investigation of the antecedents and consequences 
of lacking of job security and thereby increased the reliability of my findings. 
The starting point of my research was the implicit assumption that formal 
institutions impact individual behaviors in preconceived and straightforward ways, 
which is the assumption underlying the large bulk of the comparative research on 
welfare states and production systems. Hall and Soskice (2001a), for example, argued 
that formal institutions, such as labor laws and welfare provisions, enable firms to 
pursue specific business strategies. In countries with generous unemployment benefits 
and stringent employment protection, it is therefore less risky for employers and 
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employees to invest in training and the acquisition of skills than in countries without 
these benefits and protections. While this argument is highly plausible, it hinges on the 
assumption that generous unemployment benefits and stringent dismissal protection do 
indeed make workers confident about their future employment situation.  
My work elucidates the effectiveness of formal institutions to instill confidence 
and positive expectations and thus channel individual behaviors by empirically 
analyzing the first step in the causal chain of this highly plausible argument, i.e., the 
question of whether institutions shape individual perceptions and attitudes, as this is 
the necessary condition for getting actors to behave in a particular way (e.g. acquiring 
certain types of skills). The particular focus of my work was on exchange situations 
that are characterized by unequal power between the two parties, such as an employee-
employer relationship. 
To account for the fact that formal institutions can achieve their stated goals in 
various ways, I distinguished between the following three types of institutional 
mechanisms: (1) mechanisms that seek to increase the power of the party with the 
greater dependence on the exchange outcome; (2) mechanisms that seek to provide 
assurance and thereby reduce the vulnerability of the exchange partner who has to deal 
with the negative consequences of a unilateral breach of the contract; (3) mechanisms 
that improve the relative position of those with greater dependence on the exchange 
outcome by establishing a reference group with considerably lower levels of 
protections.  
Three types of labor market policies capture these three types of institutional 
mechanisms. Dismissal protection reduces the power-differentials between the 
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employee and the employer; unemployment benefits provide workers with 
compensation in case they are laid off by their employers; legislation allows the 
employment of temporary workers to increase the relative position of permanent 
employees (although the first and foremost intention of such legislations is to partly 
increase labor market flexibility for employers). The impacts of these three types of 
institutional mechanisms were explored in two studies. 
The main findings of my quantitative analyses are that dismissal protection, 
which increases employees’ position vis-à-vis their employers, does not make them 
feel more confident about keeping their jobs. Likewise, working in an environment 
where many other employees are less well protected against job loss (because they 
work on temporary and not permanent contracts) also does not increase workers’ 
cognitive job security. Only the interaction of both types of formal institutions, i.e., the 
joint presence of stringent dismissal protection and a high proportion of temporary 
workers, as it is the case in countries such as Portugal, Spain, France, and Germany, 
makes workers confident about keeping their jobs. In contrast, unemployment 
benefits, which provide employees with compensation in case the employer terminates 
the employment relationship, have a positive and statistically significant association 
with affective job security; i.e., they reduce workers’ worries associated with job loss. 
Generally speaking, formal institutions that reduce vulnerability or provide assurance 
thus seem to actually have the capacity to instil confidence and positive expectations. 
The qualitative analyses of the in-depth interviews with university employees 
in Germany and the U.S. were helpful to better understand the findings of the 
quantitative study, which partly challenged the rational-choice assumption that 
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institutions impact individual perceptions and attitudes in a straightforward way. One 
main finding of this second study is that employees either know very little about 
formal policies, especially dismissal protection, or if they are informed about their 
rights and protections, they do not believe that those institutions that seek to reduce 
power differentials between the exchange partners would actually act in their interest 
and protect them against unfair treatment.  
The qualitative study also confirmed that the impact of formal institutions 
which seek to reduce vulnerability can indeed help to reduce worries associated with 
potential job loss. Workers in Germany, who could expect to sustain their standard of 
living even in case of unemployment thanks to the social provisions, almost 
unanimously said that they would rely on unemployment benefits if they lost their 
jobs; workers in the U.S., on the other hand, were sceptical about the usefulness of 
unemployment benefits. In contrast to workers in Germany, the expectation of being 
able to quickly find a new job of comparable quality was much more reassuring for 
them.  
 A third important insight from the qualitative study and which is also in line 
with the findings from the quantitative analyses is that contextual factors on the 
macro-level are much less important for individuals’ perceived job security than what 
is happening in their immediate environment. In particular, organizational changes, the 
perception of being (in)dispensable because of one’s position or skills, and the 
relationships with management and supervisors are most the important factors for 
employees’ confidence about keeping their jobs. 
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Taken together, the findings if my studies are both of theoretical and practical 
relevance. The theoretical implication of my research is that the effectiveness of 
formal institutions to generate confidence and positive expectations, and hence 
subsequently impact behaviors, is contingent on the specific mechanisms that are 
incorporated in the different types of formal institutions. My analyses showed that the 
relationship between policies and individual-level behavior is not as straightforward 
often assumed. Those policies that provide assurance by reducing vulnerability 
(unemployment benefits) seem to be more effective in instilling confidence and 
positive expectations than those that reduce power differentials in an exchange 
situation (dismissal protection). These policies are only effective when others of 
comparable rank are in a much more vulnerable position (i.e., in the presence of a 
large share of temporary workers), or vice versa. 
In addition, several practical implications can also be drawn from the study. 
Governments and organizations in those countries with no or low levels of dismissal 
protection but generous unemployment benefits (e.g., Denmark) have less reason to 
worry about their workforce’s perceived job security than governments and 
organizations in those countries with the opposite institutional configuration (e.g., 
Portugal). However, caution is required. Although dismissal protections fail to show a 
positive impact on workers’ cognitive job security in the absence of a large proportion 
of temporary workers, cutting back these protections is not recommended. Even if the 
existing safeguards seem not to provide a feeling of security, removing them would 
certainly unsettle employees, as suggested by the work on relative deprivation.  
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Policy makers can use the findings of my analyses to evaluate existing labor 
market policies and to help inform the development of new policies with respect to 
their effectiveness in making workers feel secure about their jobs and providing them 
with confidence regarding their labor market prospects.  
Organizations that seek to avoid the negative consequences of a lack of job 
security need to consider that the sources of such confidence can strongly vary across 
groups of employees. For some, it is particularly important to believe that they are 
indispensable for the organization thanks to their particular jobs, position, and skills. 
For others, a good relationship with management and supervisors is the main source of 
confidence. However, it can be stated that regularly providing employees with 
feedback and ensuring that organizational restructuring processes are accompanied by 
a clear and transparent communication strategy is important in general.  
By examining the “subjective dimension” of economic life, this research 
supplements work done by economists and organizational psychologists. In contrast to 
the labor economists, who have used national employment institutions to explain 
actual labor market outcomes, this research examined the impact of labor market 
institutions on perceptions. Focusing on perceptions is important because they often 
entail real outcomes, even if based on “incorrect” interpretations of what is happening 
in one’s environment. The expectation of a job loss, even though the job may actually 
not be endangered, has real consequences, as a broad body literature in organizational 
psychology and economics has shown. Employees suffer from the negative 
psychological and physiological consequences associated with the lack of job security, 
and employers have to deal with decreased loyalty, reduced organizational 
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commitment, and elevated turnover rates. The economy as a whole, moreover, can be 
harmed by slumps in consumer spending and excessive wage restraints. 
In contrast to the organizational psychologists, who have used organizational 
characteristics and individual differences to explain perceived employment outcomes, 
this research focused on the effects of important context variables, i.e., national laws, 
policies, and regulations. Previous research has shown that jointly considering both 
higher and lower-level characteristics and their interactions is crucially important for 
social science research because associations between micro-level variables often vary 
across contexts (e.g., Allmendinger & Hackman, 1995; 1996; Anderson, 2009a; 
Becker, Huselid, Pickus, & Spratt, 1997; Hackman, 2003; Johns, 2006; Paxton, 2007).  
Although the popularity of statistical multi-level techniques has increased and 
entered into all disciplines in the social sciences over the last several years, studies in 
organizational behavior have only applied multi-level analyses in a sparse way and 
used a rather narrow definition of context. While organizational characteristics have 
indeed been included in the analyses, the larger context in which organizations are 
embedded has largely been ignored (Anderson & Pontusson, 2007; Chung & van 
Oorschot, forthcoming; Erlinghagen, 2008 are some of the notable exceptions). My 
studies are an attempt to further close this gap.  
Before concluding this paper with several avenues for future research, some 
limitations need to be mentioned. The first limitation relates to the structure of the 
quantitative data. Since the data used in the analyses are only cross-sectional, no 
causal statements can be drawn based on the analyses. Do institutions impact 
perceptions or do perceptions perhaps create demand for certain institutions? Although 
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it seems more likely that institutions impact perceptions than vice versa, especially 
given that labor market regulations and policies have been pretty stable in recent years 
(OECD Stats, 2009), both directions of causality are reasonable and possible. 
 An additional shortcoming is that important individual and organizational-level 
variables (e.g., type of contract, income, or organizational size) are not available in the 
data. Moreover, the effects of the two different types of labor market policies cannot 
be assessed separately, i.e., passive labor market policies or unemployment benefits 
that provide laid-off workers with the means to sustain their living even after job loss, 
and active labor market policies that help them to quickly find a new job by helping 
them in finding offers, preparing for interviews, or getting retrained. The reason for 
this shortcoming is that the expenditures for the two types of policies are highly 
correlated and therefore cannot be incorporated as separate variables into the models. 
 The qualitative study could also be improved by extending the in-depth 
interviews to employees working in other organizations and economic sectors. 
Although universities are an ideal setting for case studies on perceptions of job 
security, particularly when done in a cross-national comparative perspective, it is 
highly likely that private sector employees are much more sensitive to economic 
changes and that they have more varied working biographies that would allow the 
researcher to draw more in-depth conclusions about the impact of previous 
experiences (including those with formal institutions) on current feelings of job 
security. 
These limitations, however, can also be valuable starting points for further 
research. First, future studies should investigate the causal relationships underlying the 
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phenomena described in this paper by using longitudinal data. Therefore, questions on 
subjective feelings of job security should be included in panel studies such as the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which has already incorporated questions on 
perceptions and attitudes, or the American Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). 
Second, in order to explore whether the general conclusions about the relationships 
between macro-level institutions and micro-level perceptions described in this paper 
can also be found in other exchange situations characterized by unequal power and 
dependence, this type of study should be done in other research settings. An example 
for such an analysis could be the relationship between a producer and a consumer 
when of purchasing goods are involved whose quality is not easily assessed before 
consumption. Third, in order to further explore whether the differences between the 
abilities of the various institutional mechanisms to generate confidence and positive 
expectations can indeed be generalized, it would be useful to conduct experiments. An 
example for such a research project could be a trust game that involves unequal pay-
off schemes between the exchange partners to capture the constellation of unequal 
power as contextual conditions are varied.  
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APPENDIX 
 Table A: Clustered Regression on Cognitive Job Security 
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Table B: Clustered Regression on Perceived Employment Prospects 
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Table C: Clustered Regression on Affective Job Security 
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Table D: Random Coefficient Model on Cognitive Job Security 
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Table E: Random Coefficient Model on Perceived Employment Prospects  
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Table F: Random Coefficient Model on Affective Job Security 
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Table G: Standardized Values of Random Intercept Models on Cognitive Job Security 
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            Table H: Standardized Values of Random Intercept Models on  
Perceived Employment Prospects 
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 Table I: Standardized Values of Random Intercept Models on Affective Job Security 
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Interview Schedule 
R_____ 
Date:________ 
Time Started:_______ 
Time Ended:_________ 
 
Introduction 
I'm doing this study to learn more about how people see their professional future, what 
they think about their labor market prospects, what makes them feel confident and 
secure about their work, and what – if anything – usually worries  them about jobs and 
future careers.  Before we start, do you have any questions for me? 
 
Here is a confidentiality agreement that I developed together with the data protection 
officer at HU and with the Institutional Review Board at Cornell. Please take your 
time reading the agreement. If you feel comfortable, please sign it. I'll be taking notes 
and would like to tape what you say if that's okay with you.  But please feel free to ask 
me to turn off the tape at anytime or take a break. 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PART I 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Professional Development and Instabilities in Careers and Jobs 
To start the interview, people usually tell me about their career and employment 
history. Only later in the interview will I ask some specific questions. So, if it is okay 
with you, I would be happy to hear how you got to where you are today. Please start 
with whatever you feel like. 
Possible suggestions: 
 Why did you apply for a job at CU/HU? 
 Why did you choose a certain career? 
 Why have you (never) changed your employer? 
 When did you know that you wanted to become… ? 
• If you compare your current work situation with the work situation when you 
first  started working for HU/CU, what has changed? 
• What phases of instability have you faced in your working life? 
• Please tell me a bit about these phases. How did you feel? How did these 
phases impact other aspects of your life (e.g., family/social life)? How did you 
deal with … (such phases of instability and uncertainty)? 
 
Uncertainties, Anxieties, and Frustrations at Work 
Now I would like to hear something about your current job. What would be especially 
interesting to me is to learn about those things that you like about your current job and 
 135 
those that you find frustrating and maybe even scary. Again, please start with 
whatever you like. 
 
Possible suggestions:  
Please tell me about the  
• formal and informal hierarchies at work,  
• your relationships with your colleagues and your supervisor,  
• open or hidden rivalries, 
• evaluation and promotion practices in your department/unit. 
 
• Every now and then, we are confronted with the fear of not knowing what is 
going to happen next and often this perspective worries us. Can you please tell 
me about such a situation in your working life? 
• How did you deal with this situation? What factors contributed to/reduced this 
uncertainty? 
 
Additional questions if answers go in the direction of cognitive job security 
• How important is job security to you? 
• Was job security an important factor when you decided to work 
for CU/HU? 
• If you compare your current job situation to those of your 
colleagues, how does your job situation differ (for example with 
regard to the security they have in staying in their current 
position)? 
 
• What will your professional future look like? What types of changes do you 
expect? 
• What are your biggest worries related to work? 
 
Additional questions if answers go in the direction of cognitive job security 
• Have you always been worried about losing your job?  
• If yes/no, why? 
 
Implicit Promises and Legal Rights Associated with the Employment Contract 
Working for someone or an organization implies mutual giving and taking.  
• Thinking about work in these terms, what are your obligations vis-à-vis 
HU/CU?  
• From the other direction, what are the obligations of HU/CU vis-à-vis you? 
Possible additional questions: 
To what extent do you feel obliged to stay with your employer?  
To what extent is your employer obligated to have good reasons or 
‘good cause’ to discharge you?  
In the past, how has HU/CU handled lay-offs? 
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Experience with unemployment 
Please tell me about the periods of time in your life when you did not have work and 
were looking for a job. 
Possible additional questions: 
• How long were you unemployed and how often? 
• How much unemployment benefits would you receive if you were to receive a 
lay-off notice today? 
• Are any family members, friends, or neighbors currently unemployed?  
 
Possible additional questions: 
• Have they had trouble finding a new job? 
• In what respect does their unemployment affect you? 
 
Participation in Training 
Please tell me about the training possibilities here at CU/HU? 
• What types of training have you participated in?  
Possible additional questions: 
• On whose initiative did you participate in this training/these 
trainings? 
• How often did you participate? 
• Will the skills you acquired in these trainings also be useful 
when you change jobs/employers? 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
PART II 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Demographic Characteristics and Job Characteristics  
1. How old are you? 
2.  Are you married?  
If yes, does your spouse work outside the home? 
__ Yes, full time 
__ Yes, part time 
__ No, studies and/or takes care of child(ren) 
__ No, retired or unemployed) 
 
3. Do you have kids? If yes, how many? 
4. What is your education? 
5. Are you or have you been member of a union? 
6. For how many employers do you work? 
7. What type of position do you hold at HU/CU?  
8. On how many temporary contracts have you worked in your entire working 
career (i.e., including the time before you came to CU)?  
9. Do you work full-time or part-time? 
10. Do you supervise others at work?  
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